'Developmental Local Government': The Second Wave of Post-Apartheid Urban Reconstruction

By Firoz Khan[*]

Again last week in this House, I said that much of what is happening in our

[*] Firoz Khan is the head of the Research Office of the South African Parliament and has written extensively on local government, globalisation, urban policy and development politics.

country, which pushes us away from achieving this goal [translating national unity and reconciliation into a reality] is producing rage among millions of people. I am convinced that we are faced with the danger of a mounting rage to which we must respond seriously. In a speech again in this House, we quoted the African-American poet Langston Hughes when he wrote: "What happens to a dream deferred?" His conclusion was that it explodes.[1]

As with all societies that are struggling to defuse the tension between the "softening" of the competition necessary for democratization and the "sharpening" required for economic liberalization [2], South Africa's attempt to engineer a new balance between the market, state and society, that strives to liberate the creative energies of entrepreneurship without eroding the social bases of co-operation [3], is likely to be confronted by a range of important challenges and contradictions that will impact very fundamentally on the entire socio-institutional and economic fabric.[4] In *balancing* - the popular conservative term - the growth imperative with the expansion of the frontiers of socio-material citizenship, the present government has stressed the need for a strategic approach emphasizing the interdependence between structural and legal reform on the one hand, and socio-institutional transformation on the other.[5] The government has invested a great deal of time and energy in engineering the complementarities and interdependencies through attempts to transform established worldviews (through policy papers, legislation, regulations, etc.); introducing "soft technologies of institutional change (combining latitude, hierarchy, initiative and entrepreneurship in intricate ways – privatization, partnerships, participatory budgeting, integrated development plans, etc.); and, utilizing 'community' for the spatialisation/territorialisation of government informed by local specificities and contingencies.[6] The deployment of state power to mobilize 'social capital'; reconfigure institutional arrangements and relationships; and recode citizenship in a more inclusive manner that is driven by locally determined priorities and objectives, albeit mediated in very specific and stochastic ways, represents a decisive break with the past wherein low infrastructural power and high despotic state power,[7] especially at the local level, was ruthlessly employed to realize the objectives of control, surveillance, 'orderly' development and discipline.[8] The movement away from the bifurcated apartheid state[9] to the post-apartheid 'infrastructural' state wherein the institutional and political objectives are *developmentally driven*, while the developmental purposes are *politically negotiated and community driven*, the **defining characteristics** of developmental (local) government,[10] allows for the dynamic reinvention of the public/private divide underpinned by embryonic (local) forms of coproduction[11] and publicazation.[12] The role of the developmental local state in this context is one of 'catalyst'[13], sparking the diverse sources of socio-developmental energy with the aim of socially constructing a range of competitive assets (resources, capabilities, organizations).[14] In this way, the catalytic state strikes a dynamic balance between the creative energies of private entrepreneurship, the social bases of co-operation and the infrastructural co-ordinative capacity of government.

The Occasional Paper amplifies and builds on some of these themes by pointing to the

centrality of local government in crafting synergies and sparking diverse sources of socio-developmental energies with a view to finding sustainable ways to meet the social, economic and material needs of communities and improve the quality of their lives. Parnell and Pieterse's discussion of the changes in SA urban planning frameworks and its relationship to changes in international development discourse and approaches is provocative as it forces the reader to question the much vaunted 'exceptionalism' of South Africa's social and political formation. Unfortunately, their use of Mabin and Smit's (1997) work as a referent point is problematic as it tells us precious little about the materiality of power; i.e. the articulation of race, space, class, gender, ethnicity, etc. In the past, such descriptive motifs proved to be very damaging to radical human geography, placing these geographers on a path on which the logical terminus was intervention in politics and institutions, "not with the objective to transform power relations, but instead to contribute to the conclusion of a post-apartheid social contract".[15] An attempt is made to address the materiality of power in their section on the *Global Influences on Developmental Local Government*. It would have been more useful for the document to combine this section with the previous one which would have brought the issue of planning, power and spatial scales more sharply into focus. The conjoining of integrated local government management, democratic municipal governance, fiscal accountability and spatial planning coupled to its interrogation through the 'institutional' prism is a welcome relief from more orthodox discussions of local government that devote far too much attention on local government as an 'autonomous sphere'. The approach also vindicates the pronouncements of critical planners and geographers who argue that the prospects of further social reform requires action to be directed at the present rules (constituted by the state that impress upon cities their built form and the distribution of benefits) rather than at the design of the future. Planners, they argue, need a new vision that 'centres on the ensembles of political structures that produce the city.'[16]

The weaknesses of Parnell and Pieterse's paper are numerous. Space does not permit detailed engagement with the various problem areas. I will therefore keep my comments short and abbreviated for the purposes of economy and suggest areas for further research.

The first and major problem with the paper is the non-recognition of the disjuncture between the diachronic nature of urban development and the synchronic nature of administrative and planning interventions in the built environment. The discussion of an IDP process (paragraph 2, pp.15) underscores the linearity or synchronicity of the planning intervention commencing from survey and then moving to plan to action. Under conditions of rapid household decompression, circulatory/oscillatory migration, grinding poverty and homelessness, the IDP process is not easily reconciled with the diachronic nature of development which moves through contradictory leaps and fusions. Although this disjuncture might be recognized by policy makers, academics and intellectuals alike, the movement from 'oppression' to 'emancipation' is still overwhelmingly cast, both subliminally and practically, in 'rational planning'.

The opposition to apartheid planning based itself, of course, on an alternative but very much a modernist conception of planning – planning intended to redistribute power and comfort in a comprehensive and rationalist way, predicated on the notion of continued change in what seemed to be the relatively unilinear processes of economic development of the period. Thus conflict over the shape of the cities was essentially a conflict, heightened in the late 1970s and early 1980s, between two rationalist movements and planning approaches, despite their basis in conflicting nationalisms….[I]n 'developing countries', 'it was thought that modernism would save cities from Europe's industrial-capitalist urban chaos.' Both the rationalist views of urban South Africa sought to do just that, one through planned oppression, the other through planned emancipation….The narrative of contemporary change in Johannesburg and other southern African cities is partly about the problems of finding a means to handle, politically, waking up in a postmodern era while equipped only with the politics and planning practices of a modernist past.[17]

Secondly, the authors argue that IDP is the primary tool to ensure the integration of local government activities with other tiers of development planning at provincial, national and international levels. In this sense it serves as the basis for communication and interaction between the different tiers of government and spheres of governance. Although there is nothing objectionable in this assertion, it is surprising that the authors make no reference [18] to the fact that local authorities have yet to be integrated as a distinct sphere into the broader system of government. Formal institutions to promote intergovernmental relations between local and national and provincial governments are either embryonic or non-existent. As a consequence, where concurrent responsibilities extend to the local level, these are generally not integrated with national and provincial programmes. Part of this has to do with the fact that the focus of IGR thus far has been on the relations between national and provincial governments, but it also has to do with the variable capacities of local government. [19] The creation of formal institutions, procedures and conventions to promote intergovernmental relations and co-operative governance between the different spheres, especially from a local government perspective, will likely be finalized by the end of this year but the space to influence this process is rapidly closing in the face of various legislative interventions (Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations Act; Division of Revenue Act; Introduction of an Equitable Share of Nationally Raised Revenue for Local Government; etc.), budgetary directives and regulations issued by the Department of Finance.[20] The fiscal predetermination of the relationship between the different tiers could potentially short-circuit institutional and political objectives being *developmentally driven*, and the developmental purposes being *politically negotiated and community driven.*

Thirdly, the paper does not stop to ponder the problems associated with the DFA. While the DFA provides the opportunity for creative thinking about the role of urban governance in transforming the apartheid city and strategically inserting our cities into the global economy, critics charge that the Act could, if used incorrectly by provincial governments, deprive local governments of their traditional control over land-use planning.

Although this may well become justifiable if conservative (increasingly multi-racial) suburban communities use the old planning regulations to maintain the structure of the apartheid city by preventing the establishment of nearby informal settlements, what the suburbs will have achieved in the end is the disempowerment of local government. This may work in favour of the poor at first, but in the long run it is not the poor who are good at lobbying higher levels of government, but the middle class and their powerful NGO lobbyists.[21]

Others argue that instead of the Act being a short, enabling piece of legislation, it is lengthy and complex which may be difficult to administer in view of the capacity constraints at national and provincial government levels. There are also weaknesses in terms of institutional arrangements. The Development and Planning Commission, for example, is a purely advisory structure without any executive powers, and may therefore lack the status or authority to sustain itself as a significant institutional body.[22] A final weakness flagged by critics of the Act is that it falls short of reforming land tenure thoroughly which for many is at the heart of the numerous delays and backlogs.[23]

Fourthly, although the paper makes mention of the financial constraints within which local government is compelled to work and the 'policy schizophrenia' that is induced, the authors argue that the budget will be the arbitrating mechanism for deciding on municipal priorities, 'thus forcing inter-sectoral or inter-departmental assessment of local needs for the first time' (9, 13). Sadly, the paper should have devoted more time and attention to assessing the impact of the very restrictive financial regime on local government's capacity to deliver in a developmental manner. The tight financial and budgeting constraints imposed on local government by the Department of Finance [24], the fiscally driven nature of intergovernmental relations, the 'minimalist' planning control orientation of the Development Planning Commission [25], the inordinate power exercised by the professional associations (a point I will return to later) and private sector in displacing socially transformative planning objectives and programmes, and the lack of any meaningful participation by communities in the demarcation of new local government boundaries could potentially push development planning towards one that emphasizes functional integration of the space economy (generally top down planning), whereby resources of a locality or region are exploited purely for profit and revenue maximization. This is a far cry from the IDP's emphasis on building territorial integrity (generally bottom up planning), in terms of which a locality's resources are developed for the benefit of the local population.[26]

Fifthly, citizenship in the IDP format is expressed through 'community'. 'Community', not society, serves as the institutional building block for a new spatialisation/territoralisation of government. Community demarcates a sector for government, a sector whose vectors and forces can be mobilized and deployed in novel programmes and techniques which operate through the instrumentalisation of personal allegiances and active responsibilities: government through

community. 'Society' is to be regenerated, and social justice maximized through the building of responsible communities, prepared to invest in themselves. Governing is to occur not through the politically directed, nationally territorialised, bureaucratically staffed and programmatically rationalized projects of a centrally concentrated state, but through instrumentalising the self-governing properties of subjects of government themselves in a whole variety of locales and localities – enterprises, associations, neighborhoods, interest groups, community. Community, from this perspective, is made calculable by a whole variety of reports, investigations and statistical enquiries and is to be acted upon in a multiple of authoritative practices and professional encounters. Community, in short, is to be governmentalised.

It is indeed remarkable how little attention is paid in the paper to 'community' as the institutional building block for the spatialisation of government and the implications of this for thinking anew our inherited conceptions of citizenship. The shift to 'community' reflects an imperative to fashion a revised way of governing to make it consistent with the heterogeneity of the forms in which struggles are now carried out and with new conceptions of subjectivity. Urban planners and policymakers need to engage inventively with the possibilities opened up by the imperatives of the activity and the image of plural affinities. The role of such analyses should be to diagnose, to identify the points of weakness that might be exploited if we are to "maximize the capacity of individuals and collectivities to shape the knowledges, contest the authorities and configure the practices that will govern them in the name of freedoms and commitments."[27]

If the paper is relatively silent on this matter, the silence with regard to demarcation, the territorialisation of government, is deafening. This is very worrisome as the Demarcation Act has come in for some heavy criticism from NGOs [28] who argue that criteria for the demarcation of new local government boundaries is vague in that many are not quantifiable and can therefore be applied subjectively to each municipal case. The list of "demarcation objectives" and "factors to be taken into account" gives no indication as to where trade-offs may be acceptable, how many of the criteria need to be met, and to what extent (financial viability, for instance can be long and/or short term). Moreover, the Act makes no provision for mechanisms for including local stakeholder input in prioritizing the demarcation criteria. A further concern expressed by many development activists is that local economic initiatives and completed IDPs/LDOs may be undermined if there is insufficient awareness of local dynamics and programmes that would be gathered via consultation.[29] The ability of the Board to decide the terms under which it will engage with communities conveys the impression that the Board can simply move through communities dictating the terms of their effective boundaries. Very little is said in the Act to ensure that the views of communities are heeded, and there is no clear undertaking that boundaries will be changed or amended upon objections being lodged.

The fact that the criteria for demarcation are not prioritized coupled to no mention being made in the Act for 'community' input and/or influence raises a host of problems. Regardless of

how carefully, or even dare we say meticulously, boundaries are designed they will 'always arbitrarily dissect a host of organic boundaries related to forms of social organization and geography as well as the functional routes of distribution'.[30] Secondly, fixing space and bounding territories is often used as 'a strategy for asserting power'. Because this 'must always be a political process, it can seldom happen in a straightforward (uncontested) way'. Experience suggests that spatial geometries, 'imposed and imposing in their ordering of society' are regularly undermined as places are experienced and remoulded by those who live and work in them. Their meanings are thus constantly challenged and politicized. [31] International case studies of city government formation and functioning support this assertion. These studies demonstrate that despite the radical nature of reorganization and the significant structural changes implied in metropolitan restructuring, conservatism in respect of countenancing radical change to historic boundaries and compromise in the face of local resistance to change can lead to disastrous results; i.e. ghettoisation, inner city decline, racial violence, etc.[32]

The Demarcation Act needs to be read in conjunction with the Municipal Structures Bill and the Local Government Systems Bills.[33] The Structures Bill covers the types of municipalities to be established within the categories already laid out in the Constitution. It also tries to lay out how powers and functions will be divided between categories of municipalities. Moreover, the Bill attempts to regulate the internal systems structures and conduct of the office-bearers of municipalities.

Concerns voiced by NGOs about the Bill are numerous. NGO activists are of the view that the advisory status of the ward committees, the absence of any meaningful legislative injunction to expand gender representivity beyond the PR list coupled to very little clarity being provided on the relationship between area and functional committees could undermine the developmental thrust of local government as important voices are marginalised/ignored/displaced in the bureaucratic quagmire. The Bill has also been criticised on the grounds that it centralizes power in the hands of the MEC who determines the type of municipality within demarcated boundaries; declares 'developing municipalities', dissolves councils and takes back functions.[34] The sloppy wording of the Bill and the wide ranging powers over local government conferred on the MEC has unsettled many development activists who feel that the Bill might be unconstitutional in that local government is 'treated as a dependent tier' by national and provincial governments.

It is not possible to discuss all these issues at great length in a document of this type. I would however like to amplify one theme which is of particular importance to the evolving relationship between national-provincial government and their sphere/s of influence over local government. Although the MEC has wide ranging powers as outlined in the Bill, it needs to be borne that when the Demarcation Board fixes boundaries employing the unweighted criteria contained in the Act for which municipal types will be decided, the Board will do so with a

municipal type already in mind. The Board will thus effectively 'pre-empt provincial decisions on municipal types'

But the structure of the [Act and the Bill] hides this by separating the power of each player (demarcation boards and provincial governments) each into separate [pieces of legislation], as if they bear no relation. In reality they do bear a strong relation. The implications of this for the Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal should be considered…within these provinces, as there have objections from both provinces to the Bill. The attempt to hide the political implications of powers taken from the provinces and given to the national demarcation board has not gone unnoticed.[35]

Section 78 of the Bill states that the Minister may make regulations not inconsistent with this Act prescribing any matter that may or must be prescribed in terms of this Act; and any matter that may facilitate the application of this Act. This section has served to fuel the fears of those who 'perceive' a strong centralizing trend in recent local government legislation.

The cumulative effect of the Demarcation Act and Municipal Structures Bill could potentially ensconce administrators, technical experts and politicians firmly in the local government transformation hot-seat. If the argument about community being used to spatialise and territorialise government is accepted, a strong case can be made that the state is defining the 'community', delimiting its spatial field of interaction, and engineering the administrative machinery to mediate its relationship with communities.

This type of spatial and institutional thinking which attempts to fix communities in space, and to hegemonise the meaning of particular spaces through the deployment of infrastructural power could potentially close off contestation and democracy. In one sense, civil society is being reduced to an administrative-planning mechanism, to a system of the reproductive compensations of co-operation that is purely technical, directed, under the present neoliberal regime, towards the reproduction of social relationships in their present identity. Thus, even while the real elements of civil society wither in the cut and thrust of postmodernity identity reconstruction, its image is re-proposed at a higher level. In order to affirm the pre-eminence of an idea of the image of civil society, the new, and maybe even postmodern, state takes away any social dialectic that might constitute an actual civil society. By rendering every relationship of power horizontal, the state annuls every social power and obliges it to find meaning only in the form of the state, albeit in a conflictual and tense manner. Not surprisingly, incipient citizenship rights associated with new democracies, like South Africa, will inevitably be patchy in coverage, unstable and reversible in content.[36] Whether developmental local government and IDPs offer a way forward is something I will return to shortly.

Sixthly, the paper says very little[37] about the structural constraints that could potentially frustrate our efforts in moving to a progressive development planning regime. The major

constraint revolves around the functioning and operation of the land and property markets. The vision propounded by progressive urbanists around compaction and integration begins to break down as it is moved into practice. The integrating vision at the city scale is 'apparently based on a (postmodernist) critique of the fragmented city;' but the integrating power that is required is steadily diminishing as a 'simultaneous tide rises of deregulation and the zoning power of land rent'.[38] This sentiment has been echoed by other radical human geographers.

If capitalism fails to write itself into the landscape through this [post-apartheid] modernist planning discourse, the accoutrements of postmodernism in the domain of consumption and architecture represent another modernist (i.e. economically progressive) language competing to structure the South African city. In addition, by including a new non-racial middle class in the spheres of both housing and consumption goods, the direction of change in the social structure of South African society and the fabric of its cities could well be managed by a new technocratic elite set upon recovering economic prowess in the face of international competition and internal political demands. In this scenario the fixity of categories such as 'Third World' sector (to describe black culture, the informal economy and non-formal living spaces – a particularly racist formation …) will continue to be mirrored in the urban landscape, and will probably be increasingly accepted as South Africa discovers that, like most poor countries, the urban housing crisis cannot be solved within the disciplining constraints of contemporary capitalist economic growth and distribution.[39]

But is this outcome inevitable? Case studies of some South East Asian cities, Hong Kong and Singapore in particular, clearly demonstrate how living standards and the quality of life of the majority can be radically improved through aggressive intervention in land and housing markets. In both these city-states, urban policies have been painstakingly designed and successfully implemented. The populations no longer regard a lack of basic services to be a general problem. Public transport is efficiently and profitably run. Public housing accommodates a majority of the population, and the creative use of public funds has attracted widespread attention.[40] Engaging with this dilemma from another angle, some critical urban analysts have identified instances of global-export manufacturing trends as encouraging the integration of small and intermediate urban centres with markets, though again this has been in countries with the sort of interventionist powers out of favour in neoliberal planning orthodxy,[41] eg. Taiwan, South Korea, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, Silicon Valley, Scotland.[42] It is doubtful whether South Africa can embark on similar projects in the face of the very strong 'home-grown'/'internally-led'[43] and 'engineered' neoconservative economic growth strategy[44] and restrictive budgetary regime.[45]

A second, though by no means of less import, set of constraints revolves around the power of professionals/professional associations and bureaucrats/bureaucracies/bureaucratic solution-sets. With regard to the latter, bureaucracy reproduces itself in the 'Weberian idiom' as

professionals ascend the ladder of hierarchy by conforming to convention, avoiding error and 'abjuring innovation'.

Normal bureaucracy values authority, control, standardisation, regularity, conformity, and quantitative targets. Professionalism values things more than people, numbers more than judgments, high technology more than low, and whatever is urban, clean, industrial and hard more than whatever is rural, agricultural, dirty and soft. Normal professionalism and normal bureaucracy are antithetical to the new views of development. In the State, they combine to resist the new paradigm.[46]

Technical, bureaucratic and professional practices and languages will thus most likely persist with some role in shaping cities for some time to come, although their position within a changing political and legislative context would vary.[47]

Nevertheless, for all states, stability, order, visibility ('surveillance') remain important ambitions and in these goals the planning and technical professions obviously play an important role. No doubt the political context within which stable, peaceful conditions are desired will be markedly different in a future South Africa, but the power relations embodied in their achievement in concrete urban form may yet be more familiar than some citizens of the post-apartheid state would wish. This would be at least partially a consequence of the strong relationship between disciplinary and governmental power and modernity and the strong prevalence of modernist projects amongst most players in the contemporary South African political scene. Certainly possibilities for more democratic planning procedures exist...But technical constraints and the search for administrative order may prove to be significant obstacles along the path to the creation of cities of emancipation rather than domination.[48]

If such is the case the paper should have devoted some space to interrogate the role of development professionals and bureaucracy in frustrating change through misreporting, selective perception, misleading questionnaires, diplomatic prudence on the part of knowledge workers, and the various methods of self defence against unwelcome news of failure. By problematising the whole process of knowledge production, bureaucratic procedure and perception, the paper would have prised open new avenues for further investigation and research that addresses diseconomies of knowledge production, dissemination and transfer. This approach would have also altered us to the role of professional and bureaucrats in defining the 'community', delimiting its spatial field of interaction (demarcation), and engineering the administrative (intergovernmental, financial, interpretative, etc.) machinery to mediate its relationship with communities.

This is by no means an exercise that is unimportant as the work of some eminent African scholars demonstrate.

Whereas the conservative [postindependence] regimes reproduced the decentralized despotism [indirect rule] that was the form of the colonial state in Africa, the radical regimes sought to reform it. The outcome, however, was not to dismantle despotism through a democratic reform; rather it was to reorganize decentralized power so as to unify the "nation" through a reform that tended to centralization. The antidote to a decentralized despotism turned out to be a centralized despotism [direct rule]. In the back-and-forth movement between a decentralized and centralized despotism, each regime claimed to be reforming the negative features of its predecessor.[49]

Inasmuch as radical regimes shared with colonial powers the desire to effect a revolution from above, they ended up intensifying the administratively driven nature of justice, customary and modern. The 'fist' of the colonial power, the local state, was tightened and strengthened. Although the bifurcated state created by colonialism was deracialised, it was only partly democratized. The deracialised, detribalised and partly democratized power that the radical states organized put a premium on administrative decision-making and tightened central control over local authorities in the name of detribalisation.

In the South African case, it is perhaps worth bearing in mind that the failure to analyze apartheid as a form of the state is simultaneously a failure to realize that the bifurcated state does not have to be 'tinged' with a racial ideology. Should this analytical failure be translated into a political one, it will leave open the possibility for such a form of control and containment to survive the current transition.[50]

If the thesis outlined above invites only pessimistic scenarios, the work of a radical human geographer provides us with a much needed palliative to press on with institutionalizing developmental local government and integrated development planning. Drawing on the work of the poststructuralists, we observe within the spatiality of the politics of identity, a politics of dislocation which eschews closure and celebrates the inevitable multiple and incomplete character of all identity. Subjects, from this perspective, are the result of the impossibility of constituting the structure as such or the location of the subject is that of dislocation. Subjects always exist in-between never fully constituted social structures. Identities therefore remain incomplete/unstable, and politics (defined as the subversion and the dislocation of the social) consists in the re-articulation of dislocated elements of given social structures, and the constitution of new symbols, myths, and social 'imagineries', until their 'literalisation' as new "objective" and fundamentally "dislocatable orders".

And Laclau contests that the "mythical" character of contemporary society is increasing – the spaces for contesting and reconfiguring dominant structures are multiplying, and thus the possibility for a radical democracy are growing, rather than diminishing.[51]

The emergent dynamics at the local level certainly point to the possibilities for the

continuation of democratic initiatives to challenge the different ways of imagining and visualizing the city, and to disrupt the assertions of closed and final identities upon which reactionary (and sometimes progressive) forces depend. The possibilities for creative, developmental and democratic politics have been prized open by DLG. The question that needs to be asked is whether the explosive rage of the majority, as alluded to by Deputy President Thabo Mbeki, portends the arrival of insurrection to be followed by creative politics or are we entering the arena of creative politics through DLG? The challenge for democracy, and in particular DLG is to build and nurture a **political space** where notions of development can compete; where their implications can be discussed and debated; and, where the function/s of institutions and space/s can be contested.[52] The creation of this political space can pierce the barriers to change by animating the impulses of ordinary people to struggle for '*what might be* against *what is*'.[53]

Notes:

[1] Deputy President Thabo Mbkei, 29 May 1998: 'Address to the National Assembly on Reconciliation'.

[2] *cf* Whitehead, L. 1993: 'On reform of the state and regulation of the market**'** in *World Development*, 21, 8 for a detailed discussion of softening and sharpening through the analytic prism of "embedded liberalism".

[3] *cf* Rodrick D. 1997: 'Sense and Nonsense in the Globalisation Debate' in *Foreign Policy*, Summer for a full discussion.

[4] Hirsch, A. & Lewis, D. 1997: 'The state and economic management in South Africa'. Paper presented to the International Roundtable on *The Capable State*, Berlin, 8-10 Oct, 2.

[5] Collins, P. 1993: 'Civil service reform and retraining in transitional economies: strategic issues and options' in *Public Administration and Development*, 13.

[6] *cf* Evans, P. 1996: *State-Society Synergy: Government and Social Capital in Development*, University of California, IAS; Rose, N. 1996: 'The death of the social? Re-figuring the territory of government' in *Economy and Society*, 25, 3, 327-356.

[7] Despotic power is the power of the state elite itself over civil society which acts arbitrarily and without constraint. Infrastructural power refers to the state's power to penetrate and co-ordinate the activities of civil society which in the SA case is premised on new organisational, administrative and institutional frameworks. Although the two dimensions of state power are not mutually exclusive. They obviously interact; i.e. the exercise of despotic power requires some infrastructure, and infrastructural power greatly enhances despotic power. *Cf* Mann, M. 1986: 'The autonomous power of the state: its origins, mechanisms and results' in J.A.Hall (ed), *States in History*, Oxford:Basil Blackwell for a discussion of the different dimensions of state power.

[8] *cf* Robinson, J. 1990: 'A perfect system of control? State power and native locations on South Africa' in *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space,* 8 (2), June, 135-162; Robinson, J. 1992: 'Power, space and the city: historical reflections on apartheid and post-apartheid urban orders' in D.Smith (ed), *The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanisation and Social Change in South Africa*, Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 292-303; Robinson, J. 1996: *The Power of Apartheid*, London: Heinemann.

[9] *cf* Gelb, S. 1998: 'Consolidating Democracy: The state and the transition from apartheid' Paper presented to the

Conference on "Democracy and the Political Economy of Reform", Cape Town, 16-18 Jan for a full discussion of the bifurcated state.

[10] Leftwich, A. 1994: 'Governance, the state and the politics of development', in *Development and Change*, 25, 2.

[11] Coproduction consists of joint participation of citizens and public administrators in the provision and production of services. It is premised on collective-collaborative actions of citizens and government agencies which privileges citizens' active participation in the production and consumption of goods and services. The process of coproduction dynamically combines and integrates accumulation, distributional and equity aspects of development through the construction of intimate connections between public and private actors, binding state and civil society together in a jointly conceptualised and determined project of socio-economic transformation – *Cf* Brudney, J.L. 1991: 'Coproduction and Local Governments' in L.R.Kemp (ed), *Privatisation: the Provision of Public Services by the Private Sector*, London: McFarland.

[12] Publicazation entails the encouragement of active participatory politics, community involvement in the management of public services, and decentralised, participatory management of service delivery – *Cf* Frug, J. 1991: 'The Choice between Privatisation and Publicazation' in L.R.Kemp (ed), *Privatisation: the Provision of Public Services by the Private Sector*, London: McFarland. Also see Bakker, I. & Miller, R. 1996: 'Escape from Fordism: The Emergence of Alternative Forms of State Administration and Output' in R.Boyer & D.Dracher (eds), *States Against Markets: The Limits of Globalisation*, London: Routledge.

[13] Catalytic states seek to achieve their goals less by relying on their own resources than by assuming a dominant role in coalitions of states, transnational institutions, private-sector groups, corporate actors, etc. The state is constantly seeking power sharing arrangements which give it scope for remaining an active centre, hence being a 'catalytic' state. C*f* Weiss, L. 1997: 'Globalisation and the Myth of the Powerless State', in *New Left Review*, 225, 3-27 for a full discussion.

[14] *Cf* Amsden, A.H. 1997: 'Editorial: Bring Production Back In – Understanding Government's Economic Role in Late Industrialisation' in *World Development*, 25, 4 for a discussion on the notion "social construction of competitive assets".

[15] *Cf* Lupton, M. 1992: 'Economic crisis, deracialisation and spatial restructuring: challenges for radical geography', in C.Rogerson & J.McCarthy (eds), *Geography in a Changing South Africa: Progress and Prospects*, Cape Town: OUP, 103.

[16] Low, N.P. 1991, *Planning, politics and the state: political foundations of planning thought*, London: Unwin Hyman, 280.

[17] Mabin, A. 1995: 'On the Problems and Prospects of Overcoming Segregation and Fragmentation in Southern Africa's Cities in the Postmodern Era', in S.Watson & K.Gibson (ed), *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 187-198, (191, 196).

[18] Save for footnote 10 about the rationalisation of IDPs and LDOs into one process. The DFA requires municipalities to produce LDOs, which are subject to provincial, as well as national, regulations. Hence, the current situation is rather complicated, with both IDPs and LDOs in the statute in most provinces. However, the White Paper suggests that LDOs be considered a component of IDPs and it appears that municipal planning legislation is soon to be developed which will simplify the situation and bring IDPs to the forefront. Although this is an encouraging development, more thought needs to be given to rationalising IDP/LDO harmonisation with the SDI interventions. Driven by the Department of Trade and Industry, the SDI interventions do not appear, in the opinion of this author, to be embedded in the emerging local and provincial government's development planning framework.

[19] Presidential Review Commission, 1998: 'Developing a Culture of Good Governance: Report of the Presidential Review Commission on the Reform and Transformation of the Public Service in South Africa – Annexure 4: Inter-Governmental Relations' – Paper by Chris Tapscott, 35.

[20] van Zyl, A. 1998: 'The local government equitable share according to the Department of Finance ' Paper presented at the Urban Sector Network White Paper Workshop on *Formulating an Implementation Framework in Response to the White Paper*, 12-13 June 1998.

[21] Swilling, M. 1996: 'Ripping the heart out of local government', in *The Mail and Guardian*, 15 March.

[22] Harrison, P. 1996: 'Adaptive flexibility and strategic vision: planning for KwaZulu/Natal in a context of change and uncertainty'. A report to the Town and Regional Planning Commission, March.

[23] 'Regional Levies Report', 1995.

[24] Six percent cap on growth of capital and current budgets; discouraging management of non-core functions; no deficit budgeting; local government budgets have to be meet criteria and formats set by the Finance Department; loans for current expenditure have to paid in the same year.

[25] Interview – David Berrisford, Department of Land Affairs, Director: Land Development Facilitation – 13 June 1998. Mr Berrisford is also a DPC Commissioner. When questioned about the inherent tensions in reconciling second with third phase development planning, and its impact on planning legislation/procedures/regulations, he responded that the Commission's job is to recommend planning processes that are 'implementable'. The thrust is towards a 'minimalist approach'; i.e. securing what is important, in line with capacity and to do what is practical.

[26] Simon, D. 1990: 'The Question of Regions', in Simon, D. (ed), *Third World Regional Development: A Reappraisal*, London: Paul Chapman, 3-23.

[27] Rose, 1996:353.

[28] Urban Sector Network, 1998: 'Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Bill – Submission in Response to the Bill', 25 May.

[29] Heese, K. 1998, 'Initial Thoughts on the Local Government Municipal Demarcation and Municipal Structures Bills'.

[30] Chipkin, I. 1996: 'Contesting Community: The Limits of Democratic Development' in *Urban Forum*, 7, 2, 217-231 (225).

[31] Robinson, J. 1995: 'Transforming Spaces: spatiality and the transformation of local government in South Africa', (unpublished), 1-29, (5).

[32] Barlow, I.M. 1991: *Metropolitan Government*, Routledge: London; Goetz, E.G. 1996: 'The US war on drugs as urban policy', in *International Journal of Urban and Regional Planning*, 20, 3, 539-539; Khan, F. 1997: 'Globalisation, Metropolitan Planning and City Development: Rethinking Metropolitan Government and Development' in R.A.Naidu & P.S.Reddy (ed), '*Metropolitan Government and Development: Present and Future Challenges'*, Durban: DDP/KAS, 39-109; Khan, F. 1994: 'Metropolitan Government and Planning: Some Lessons for South Africa' (Working Paper: 03); Mabin, A. 1995: 'Urban crisis, growth management and the history of metropolitan planning' in *Urban Forum*, 6, 1, 67-94; Sharpe, L.J. (ed), 1995: *The Government of World Cities: The Future of the Metro Model*, Chichester: John Wiley & Sons; Soja, E. 1971, *The Political Organisation of Space*, Commission on College Geography – Resource Paper No: 8, Washington: Association of American Geographers; Walker, R. 1995: 'California rages against the dying of the light' in *New Left Review*, 209, Jan-Feb, 4, 209, Jan-Feb, 42-74.

[33] The Local Government Systems Bill/Administration Bill will deal with matters such as integrated development planning, procurement and tendering, privatization, taxation levies, delegation and decentralization of powers and functions (IDASA *LOGICal steps*, April/May 1998, 01). It is difficult to comment on this Bill at the time of writing as the framework for the Bill is only available. Some of the highlights include:

- The main instruments to ensure public accountability is through the Budget and the Development Plan. With regard to the former, an obligation is placed on the Council to ensure that 'local communities are adequately informed' and that 'regulatory and enforcement functions are separated from other functions'. With regard to the Development Plan, the Framework states that the Council must 'annually adopt a **development guide**' (emphasis added). The 'guide must contain 'statements, goals, standards, maps and timeframes for **orderly** private and public development'.

- Reporting requirements for local government include 'reporting by Council to **MEC and Minister**' (emphasis added).

- Under the chapter 'Procurement and Tendering', the Framework states "**MEC powers** (emphasis added) to prescribe competitive tendering procedures'.

- In Chapter 11, Intergovernmental Relations/Cooperative Governance, under the subheading Delegations and assignments, the Framework states that '**finance follows function**' (emphasis added).

[34] *Cf* Heidemann, L, 1998: 'The Demarcation Bill and the Municipal Structures Bill'. Paper presented at the Urban Sector Network White Paper Workshop on *Formulating an Implementation Framework in Response to the White Paper*, 12-13 June 1998.

[35] Ibid, 04.

[36] Hardt, M.1994: *Labour of Dionysus: A Critique of the State Form – Theory Out of Bounds, Volume 4*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Guehenno, Jean-Marie, 199?: *The End of the Nation-State*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press (translated by Victoria Elliot).

[37] See page 9 of Isandla Occasional Paper ('tension between an acceptance...official discourse and practice')

[38] Mabin, 1995:194.

[39] Robinson, 1992:301.

[40] Yeung, Yue-Man, 1990: *Changing Cities of Pacific Asia: A Scholarly Interpretation*, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press for a more detailed discussion.

[41] Burgess, R, Carmona, M. & Kolstee, T. 1997: 'Cities, the state and the market', in R.Burgess et al (ed), *The Challenge of Sustainable Cities: Neoliberalism and Urban Strategies in Developing Countries*, London: Zed Books, 23.

[42] E-mail correspondence with M.I.Carmona, 1 June 1998. *Cf* Davila, J. 1996: 'Bogota: Restructuring with continued growth' in N.Harris & I.Fabricus (ed), *Cities and Structural Adjustment*, DPU: University College London; Henderson, J. (?), *The Globalisation of High Technology Production: Society, Space, and semiconductors in the restructuring of the modern world*, Routledge: London.

[43] Brent, R.S. 1996: 'South Africa's Economic Woes' in *Foreign Affairs*, March/April, 113-127.

[44] The recently released Poverty Report is highly critical of GEAR. The authors argue that the fiscal and monetary policy necessary to restrict inflation to a single digit may reduce employment opportunities and real income in the short term. GEAR asserts that raising the deficit above 5% will crowd out investment but the Report argues that some government investment in urban and rural infrastructure and human resources could potentially crowd in private

sector investment. The Report states that budgetary compression can constrain government in reducing poverty and inequality. The present high interest rate regime can lead to demand contraction, depressed output and lower job creation. Moreover, public sector restructuring can whittle away the existing capacity of the state. *Cf* May, J. et al, 1998: 'Poverty and Inequality in South Africa: Summary Report' – Prepared for the Office of the Executive Deputy President and the Inter-Ministerial Committee for Poverty and Inequality, 13 May.

[45] Government's deficit reduction targets are not in line with growth performance. GEAR's performance juxtaposed against growing poverty demands a full investigation into the scope for easing the deficit reduction strategy without aggravating inflation. If growth targets are not met, current and operational expenditure continues to rise and the deficit reduction programme is not revised, then cuts in capital expenditure will be necessary which will harm employment creation and impact negatively on poverty alleviation. *Cf* Krafchik, W & Robinson, S. 1998: 'The Implications of the 1998/99 Budget for Poverty Alleviation in South Africa' – IDASA: Budget Information Service – Submission to the Finance Committee – 16 March.

[46] Chambers, R. 1992: 'The Self Deceiving State' in *IDS Bulletin: New Forms of Public Administration*, 23, 4, 31-42 (31)

[47] The Local Government Systems Bill and the Municipal Structures Bill makes provision for a code of conduct for councillors and employees. This is a welcome development and will no doubt go some way in addressing the concerns of those who are fearful that democratic outcomes might be frustrated by the inordinate influence wielded by professionals and bureaucrats over the development project. Whether the code goes far enough in assuaging their fears is a debatable point.

[48] Robinson, 1992:300 – Although this was written in 1992, it is worth engaging with the writer's assertion as it alerts us to tensions and contradictions inherent in any project that places (democratic) transformation at the core of the (re)/(de)construction project.

[49] Mamdani, M. 1996: *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 26

[50] Ibid:28

[51] Robinson, 1995: 07.

[52] Chipkin, 1996:230.

[53] Marais, H. 1998: *South Africa: Limits to Change – The Political Economy of Transformation*, Cape Town:UCT Press, 268.