EXISTING MUNICIPAL INITIATIVES IN MANENBERG[1]

Firoz Khan and Sarah Thurman
Isandla Institute

December 2000

> The worst realities of our age, are manufactured realities. It is therefore our task, as creative participants in this universe to redream our world. The fact of possessing imagination means that everything can be redreamed. Each reality can have its alternative possibilities. Human beings are blessed with the necessity of transformation (Ben Okri)

Introduction

Cities are – and always have been – highly differentiated urban spaces expressive of 'heterogeneity, diversity of activity, excitement and pleasure'. They are sites for the pursuit of economic growth, pleasure and self-realisation, as well as the 'machinations of bureaucracies' and the space wherein the elite play their power games. As such they are arenas for realising a host of desires, but are also replete with systematic power, danger, oppression, domination and exclusion.[2]

Globally, cities have been the laboratories of efforts to formulate and experiment with new philosophies, policies, and social practices. But the experimenters have slowly come to realise that the heterogeneity, diversity and complexity of the city is both empowering and disarming. As sites of civic activities, the relational economies spun by people and their institutions - on local, regional, national and international levels - admit encounters of both creative and destructive sorts; and promote both progressive and oppressive development trajectories. The oscillations, and tensions generated by these 'positive' and 'negative' energies ironically invite optimistic scenarios not least because they provide two critical ingredients for dynamic organisational learning and responsive development policy; viz. ambiguity and uncertainty.[3] Moreover, it is increasingly being argued that unlike some policies over which governments have 'diminishing' control - macroeconomic policy for instance - the elements of sensible city-level policies are largely (although not completely) under the control of domestic factors and decision-makers.[4] While there is little doubt that the combined impact of structural adjustment and globalisation have emasculated the formal urban economy in many third world cities[5], city administrations and their populations have considerable leeway to experiment with innovative ideas and policies that harness community resources, social networks and local entrepreneurialism in (locally) socially responsive configurations. Not only are these policies and strategies building

---

Box 1

In Latin America, a new balance between state, market and civil organisations has been struck prompted by austerity and adjustment programmes. At first widely criticised, the 'de-scaling' of the state through downsizing and privatisation is now believed to have had positive effects, leading to the construction and mobilisation of new decentralised associations on the boundaries between state and civil society. The list of such associations is quite bewildering in its diversity - neighbourhood associations in Mexico, Christian-based communities, parents associations, producer organisations (the federation of coffee growers in Colombia), youth clubs, community movements, new social movements, non-governmental organisations and grass roots organisations. Many of these associations have moved from being 'organisations used for self-help and voicing of demands for social justice... [to] become institutionalised channels for influencing national public policy, thus providing the instruments for social incorporation and participatory democracy'. Similar examples of intense interaction between local government, communities and NGOs/CBOs exist in Anglophone Africa, West Africa and Asia

vibrant associational life and enhancing organisational effectiveness they also support and bolster the livelihood and coping strategies of the poor (see Box 1 - [6]).

What is notable perhaps about these experiments is the recognition amongst all role players to proactively engage with the very profound changes wrought by restructuring on the organisation and administration of contemporary society. On the one hand, there is the recognition amongst local government officials and politicians that the state is not the motor engine of change in the present environment. Fiscally overburdened and outmanoeuvred by transnational corporations, governments everywhere are being forced to reassess their roles in effecting change and social transformation. In the context of the diminishing capacity of the state to control and guide change - as it did in the recent past - development planning now involves creating new institutional arrangements, inventing financial strategies, influencing public opinion, and crafting interfaces between diverse sources of change and innovation.[7] In most instances, this means 'less government' through privatisation, outsourcing, deregulation, etc. But the irony of state restructuring globally is that 'less government' and 'greater participation' appears to go together in the modern era. Indeed, some authors have argued that there is a link between state restructuring/withdrawal and greater civil society participation.[8]

A variety of reasons are proffered to explain the link between state withdrawal from direct service provision and the fostering of participation. These normally centre on expanding choice, strengthening the legitimacy of the state, and ensuring sustainable development interventions. There is perhaps a deeper reason that goes beyond this instrumental logic. This is the other component of the proactive engagement (mentioned above) and relates to the 'reemergence of civil society as a collective actor in the construction of our cities and regions'.[9]

> For good or for bad, the rise of civil society has toppled entrenched regimes and has changed political geographies in ways that were unthinkable only a decade ago. Citizens have remained committed to expanding their rights even in the face of faltering economies and severely weakened structures of government…This historical assertion, this new awakening to citizen rights, revolves around three interconnected claims: the struggle for the right to *voice*, the struggle for the right to *difference*, and the struggle for the right to *human flourishing*. The first is a democratic struggle for inclusiveness in democratic procedures, for transparency in government transactions, for accountability of the state to its citizens and, above all, for the right of citizens - all citizens - to be heard in matters affecting their interests and concerns at the local level of lifespace and community. It is thus as much about the process and form of engagement of citizens in the making of their world as it is about the ends they seek to achieve. The second is a social struggle for public policies that acknowledge and assert the value of socially constructed differences in collective identities of groups living side by side in the increasingly multicultural cities of our world economy. It is a struggle…for an approach to public policy that is responsive to differences in need and material interest by groups…who have been historically marginalised and disempowered. Finally, it is a struggle for increased access to the material bases of social power - for housing, work, health and education, a life-sustaining environment, financial resources - in sum, for the basic conditions of livelihood and human flourishing.[10]

Thus the link between 'less government' and 'more participation' is more nuanced and this is where the 'parallels' and 'convergences' - so unproblematically caricatured by the 'globo-loonies' of the Kenichi Ohmae and John Naisbitt types[11] - between 'developed' and

'developing' countries requires qualification. Whilst there appear to be some level of convergence between North and South with regard to state withdrawal and increased reliance on participation - historical and political factors condition this relationship. In the SA case, the election of a new government, the adoption of a new constitution, and changes in the structure of government mark points at which legitimacy of the state may need to be strengthened to consolidate democracy at national and local levels. Secondly, unlike other developing countries, SA has a robust civil society whose engagements with the state in the realm of housing, local economic development, basic service provision and poverty eradicating strategies (more generally) have a rich history and are becoming more sophisticated. Thirdly, the re-organisation of local government in SA has the luxury of being able to consider and creatively appropriate lessons/learnings from other parts of the world where reform has 'become a relatively common phenomenon'.[12] Indeed, our status as being 'probably the only country, in recent times, to have attempted local political transition in parallel with a process of national political transition' [13] coupled to espoused government policy of furthering the aims of equity and sustainability presents us with major opportunities to rethink the development project and our institutions in radically new ways. There is presently in place a very sophisticated local government transformation agenda geared towards maximising developmental outcomes.

Notwithstanding the constraints and problems, the framework allows considerable space for innovation and adaptation at local level. The legislation underpinning institutional democratisation and restructuring privileges the interests of the poor and the vulnerable; emphasises multisectoriality and integration; deepens participation and encourages partnerships of all types. These are all components of the new generation of development policies and programmes that are slowly emerging globally, and have the potential to make a significant impact on poverty by pushing state and civil society towards poverty eradicating and democracy-enhancing roles. It is precisely the factors discussed here - consolidating democracy; appropriating the best practices available and pushing state and civil society towards democracy-enhancing and poverty eradicating roles that fired the thinking and development project of the Community Development Directorate of the Cape Town Municipality.

The Community Development Directorate

Ahmedi Vawda became the Executive Director of Community Development in 1997. The Director understood his mandate, tasks and functions as residing in three inter-related components:

Creating the conditions for people to exercise their citizenship

> My mandate - determined by the Constitution and legislation - and broadest responsibility is to provide public goods and resources. Within this, my task is to create the conditions for the poor to access the economy, to be part of the economy. Broadly, we would be saying we would be addressing the questions of citizenship…creating the conditions for people to participate in everyday life and in the economy of the city. Their citizenry guarantees their right to contribute to the economy and therefore to take public goods in order to access contributing to the economy. [But] there is a difference between those who have the right to participate and who have the vote, and those who have the resources and say the market should [decide and mediate access to the economy and public goods]…The question is are people consumers or citizens first. I would argue that they are not

consumers first. They are citizens first. The Constitution says that and the ANC articulates that even now for the local government elections. First, create the conditions upon which they are citizens…and certain things have to be given away free for the poor to access the economy…This creates the conditions for the poor to participate in the economy. Then they become customers…So you have to create the conditions for accumulation and that will allow people to enter it…Some people say that this is "Third Way' talk[14]

Creating and nurturing the conditions to govern through the public will

The new political order suggests that there is a new way in which we assemble goods and services, the way we will distribute it, and the way in which representation around that [assembly and distribution] occurs…That's democracy - people participating in the process as to how resources are allocated. This means working with the political representatives of the poor and working with the instruments [resources, institutions and development frameworks] to make it happen…But institutionally…the systems, the procedures, the processes of governing, the processes of decision-making reproduce the particular [old] social order. It remains intact…Part of our task is to create …to turn that around towards new objectives [15]

Building the capacities and capabilities for good governance through appropriate assembly of resources, institutions and frameworks

There is sufficient enabling capabilities in all the legislation…It's broad enough and progressive enough. There are lots of areas of weaknesses and in areas that it remains **silent** [16][emphasis added] but under the circumstances and the time frame in which the social order and its basis is being established, I think that it is sufficiently enabling. The weakness is a capability of assembling that array of policy instruments into meaningful programmes of implementation…There is no expertise or knowledge on how to carry out development so that the instruments that carry that through are sometimes without consequence …without a sense of what the consequences will be [17]

Community Development (COMDEV) sought to execute this mandate through the following:

Establishing health as a basis for the City's developmental approach:
There are many reasons for the choice of health as the foundational stone for COMDEV's approach. Given that the City of Cape Town has an unusually high proportion of poor people in its jurisdiction and the well established fact that 'poverty', in the words of the City's Medical Officer of Health, 'drives ill -health' [18], the health sector is uniquely positioned to make a very powerful impact. Historically, the 'most rigorous conceptualisation' of how to assemble public goods and services for maximum impact is in the health sector.[19] The MOH explained the logic as follows:

Health is dependent on intersectoral activities to get a healthy community… Poverty drives ill-health and the link around poverty and community intervention fits in perfectly with a primary health care approach which is about community participation, sustainability, preventative and promotive [care]…There are lots of health people who have done a lot of thinking around how you intervene in

communities…So often we are quite good practitioners in terms of intervening in communities…Health indicators are perhaps better and more sensitive indicators of poverty than other indicators…People in the community can often connect with health issues more easily than perhaps more academic socio-economic issues…I think its more real for people.

The key component of creating the conditions for people to exercise their citizenship is the notion of providing all citizens with a 'core package of services' informed by their priorities and needs and guided by the health indicators that prescribe the minimum level of physical well being. The Director of Finance and Administration explained the notion of core package of services as follows:

Now what do we have? You have the various parts of the community and they are districts, they could be residential areas, whatever. These are all patients that need to be consulted. We are the doctors. So I know if you're twenty-eight years old, I will look for certain things - your blood pressure, blah, blah, blah. If you're forty years old, unfortunately we also have to put the finger up the bum to check your prostate. Based on all these things, we will know as doctors…this is the minimum level of health to declare the patient healthy. We look for certain things and let's call these indicators. Now we're also looking for a whole lot of other things because the doctor doesn't only look at the blood pressure but also looks at your ear to see whether you've got wax in your ear and by the way you've got a post-nasal drip. This doesn't mean that you're ill but if you don't watch it, it can make you ill. Based on this, you will find this is the minimum level [pointing to a graph]. Anything below the line is ill health and anything above is above average or good…Now based on that we will prescribe medication…Then you are also saying that there is also legislation [which also prescribes medication]…You then take this to the community and consult. And we say to the community: "Based on what we've got [our diagnosis], we think that maybe this is what is needed". But the community will say: "Thank you very much, we will have a little bit more of that service and a little less of this". This allows you to make strategic interventions.[20]

Establishing housing as the socio-economic driver: By accessing national subsidies and using these as a leverage to provide Housing, COMDEV is of the view that the City is addressing a variety of needs. It brings resources into the city; stimulates the local economy; increases the rates base; stabilises the City politically by delivering on the most articulated need; and provides shelter with secure tenure to the most vulnerable sector.[21] The City's housing policy is multifaceted encompassing informal settlement upgrading, integrated serviced land programme, hostels upgrading initiatives, etc. A particular innovation introduced only recently is the setting up of the Cape Town Housing Company (see Box 2).

Establishing community facilities and programmes to further the aims of social development and social cohesion through various projects and initiatives in the areas of arts and culture, sports and recreation facilities, civic buildings and maintenance, education (libraries), parks and beaches. These services were described by the Acting Director of Community Services as 'frontline, direct community services'. Community services has a strong relationship in the Community Development cluster with Housing and Health. In the words of the Acting Director: "We add value and bring another dimension to the work of the cluster. Through our projects and programmes in the education (libraries), arts and culture and sports and

recreation and the provision of social amenities, we enable a broader approach to community development - promoting social cohesion and integration.'

> The delivery of community services has been strengthened by having the relationship with Health and Housing. We have also begun to build…at least theoretically understand the relationship between Ivan's [MOH] information and Joel's work. We have therefore worked to redirect the capital programme budget of the cluster to enable better synergies between community services - and our goals of promoting social cohesion and integration - and Ivan's objectives and the housing programmes. This improves the effectiveness of our interventions and improves the health and well being of the community. [22]

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:8px;">

Box 2

The Company combines personal savings with a municipal contribution and access to micro-credit and acts as a developer in the construction of houses utilising the institutional subsidy. Loans are provided by affiliated financial institutions, using beneficiary savings as security. Beneficiaries qualify for housing by entering a savings scheme and putting their names on a waiting list. The housing provided varies according to the loan taken by the individual applicant. While the housing is ultimately intended for home-ownership, the Company holds the title for the first four years after occupation, along with the terms outlined in the institutional subsidy guidelines and in order to ensure payment. Through this approach, the attempt is to cultivate a culture of payment as a means of overcoming the widespread problem of non-payment of rent, rates and service charges in low-income areas. The concept has been well received, with 25 000 registrations in the first 2 months. Show houses have been built in various residential areas and construction has begun on the first set of units. Suitable development sites are being identified across the municipality, including well-located infill sites in middle income areas. The overwhelming public interest in this approach may be seen, on the one hand, as an indication of the extent of the housing backlog. It also suggests the acceptability of the concept of savings- and credit-linked subsidies for the moderate-income sector. Obstacles, if any, appear to lie on the bureaucratic side, in the release of land, and in the access to beneficiary's capital subsidies from the Provincial Housing Board who have committed their subsidies for the forthcoming financial year.

</div>

To enable execution of the developmental mandate in a manner that is responsive to local need, enhances organisational effectiveness and pushes state and civil society towards democracy and poverty eradicating roles are two socio-institutional innovations. The first resides in the Area Co-ordinating Teams (ACTs), and the second - more internal to the organisation - relates to area/district based budgeting. Both innovations are designed to further the aims and objectives of integrated development planning. The ACTs provide the essential institutional scaffolding for co-determination of the local needs and priorities of citizens to enable them to exercise their citizenship. It is here that the content of the core package of services is identified. The ACTs also serve as forums to enable COMDEV to govern through the public will. The second innovation is about tracking and effecting changes in expenditure patterns so as to ensure that resources are effectively targeted and directed to those areas most in need. I will deal with each in turn.

There is significant controversy around how ACTs originated with some within COMDEV arguing that it was a 'strategy to address crises and service delivery problems'.[23] Others locate the history of the introduction of ACTs to a considered and programmatic engagement with alternative social empowerment projects in Latin America, Africa and Asia.[24] The details need not detain us here, suffice to note that the first explanation seems more plausible given that they were introduced in November 1999 in Hanover Park and the Atlantic Seaboard - the two localities that were engaged in quite intensive conflict with the municipality at the time. Irrespective of how they came into being, ACTs have come over the last year to be 'very valuable mechanisms' for the City.[25] Comprising officials from respective service branches operating in a specific area, councilors (proportionate and directly elected) and community members and organisations, the aims of ACTs are to:

- Co-ordinate Council services in an area
- Improve the flow of information between the community, officials and councillors
- Decentralise problem solving
- Develop area integrated development plans for both the short and long term
- Monitor and co-ordinate local projects
- Consolidate operational services and special projects in the area
- Develop public-private and public-community partnerships
- Facilitate community empowerment[26]

ACTs are solely 'a co-ordinating body and have no decision-making powers'. Issues raised at the ACT meetings 'must be actioned' by the Branch/Cluster, which is affected by the issue. The facilitator[27], together with the senior manager involved with the particular ACT, must play a monitoring function and ensure that appropriate action is taken. ACTs are chaired by a Senior Manager or Director and their role includes chairing the ACT, chairing the meetings of officials[28], and securing the support and involvement of Councillors.[29]

The second innovation - which is related to the first -aims to enhance the capacities and capabilities for good governance through enabling more effective assembly and alignment resources, institutions and frameworks. Effecting changes in how budgets are compiled and reported on is intended not only to improve targeting, they also alter the balance of power within the organisation to enable Senior Managers to direct and deploy resources in a manner that is in line with the broad developmental mandate. How is this being done? The argument - culled from the insights of different managers is as follows:

> The Executive Directors do not control spending…they monitor and regulate spending but they don't actually do the spending and decide on the budget allocations. The managers do this. [Co-ordination and integration in this context] is very hard…If you don't tamper with the financial lines of power then you never going to be able to shift the integration…And I am a direct victim of that…I came into this job and I managed five managers and I can have the most powerful vision and the most strategic thinking but I have to beg, I have to lick arse, I have to cajole, I have to stroke, I have to manipulate to try and get the managers in… They hold the budget strings…They hold the power to make decisions about where they are going to spend their money and I don't…I don't have a budget and the same with Ahmedi…Ivan controls his budget. Joel controls his budget and Ahmedi gives the strategic direction and he massages and so on. But ultimately the power lies there…In the bigger structure, it's the same way…The Executive Directors hold the budget strings…Planning they hold the power. Mark Marsden in Municipal Services…Even the power of Andrew then for that matter is very limited…Unless you have an institutional arrangement that shifts that we're never going to get integrated development. The person who is in charge of integration must have control of a budget. I don't say the main line function budget but the rigidity of this organisation is based on the strings to the money…The traditionalists hold the power and money…The new integrators or the non traditionalists have been given positions but no bucks.[30]

The Manager of Finance and Administration echoed this point:
> The present budget reflects the organogram - not service delivery…Ahmedi Vawda has got the least power because power is money and the real power sits with the managers. You can exert as much pressure on the individual managers

but they can really take you for a ride because they control their budgets and they can hide money in all sorts of places.[31]

In the absence of any radical shake-up in institutional arrangements, the Executive Director did two things. Firstly, the Manager of Finance and Administration was instructed to re-work the budgets of the different branches in a way that showed how much money was being spent in each area/district (see Box 3 for details - [32]). What the new system does is that

> Ahmedi will be able to influence more where the money should be going. He can also manage the managers better. Because remember, prescription and core package of services are the main elements of the business plan. And in terms of performance management you can say: "Hey! Wait a minute. Are you sticking to that or not?" And in that way he can manage the managers better. He's not managing [as under the existing system] in terms of don't overspend on your budget. He's ***managing*** them - Are you spending on that and that and on that and that need. And are these the end products. So it gives him more power to improve effectiveness.[33]

Over and above this, the Executive Director also created a 'discretionary fund' to finance amongst others youth development programmes. The Manager of Finance and Administration explains how the discretionary fund came about:

> I cut the budgets of certain departments in a very crude way knowing they had a bit of fat and whose services were not high priority and gave it to Arts and Culture, Sports and Recreation. I gave seven to eight million rands to Ahmedi…I called it the Executive Director's discretionary fund and with this we funded youth programmes and that sort of stuff…So what I did was classical top slicing.[34]

The changes in the way budgets are reported on has gone some way in tilting the balance of power away from the line managers for the purposes of enabling more effective assembly and alignment. The creation of a discretionary fund through top slicing has also served to partially empower the 'non-traditionalist/integrator' to leverage resources that may in the longer term catalyse improved synergies between projects and programmes especially in the zones of poverty.

Assessing the Programmes and Projects of COMDEV with particular reference to Manenberg

> Working for the city is quite hard, quite difficult…Working in a developmental way and trying to shift strategic thrust over time in an institution which has strong lines, historical lines and methodologies… is very hard…You can only do it by degrees and by slow movement…If we look back over the last three to four years, if we look how we've shifted…it really is quite miniscule but in the scheme of things, it really is quite significant [35]

Miniscule but significant! This is a common refrain of many COMDEV officials who we interviewed. There is a sense amongst COMDEV officials that their development project is progressive and ambitious but that progress is hampered by an institution that is not sufficiently geared to effect meaningful change and transformation. The Executive Director argued that the existing institutional systems, procedures, processes of governing and decision-making reproduced the old social order; and that what was desperately needed - in the absence of any fundamental overhaul of the system - was to tap into the existing 'institutional memory and knowledge' and imbue it 'with a new agenda of the new social order. The need to 'shift mindsets' and 'shift consciousness' is repeatedly pointed out as being critical to the success of the COMDEV project.

Undoubtedly, institutional inertia and the formal and informal rules of the municipality generate problems and dilemmas that retard progress towards speedy realisation of COMDEV's aims and objectives. But in many cases, the system, procedures and processes that are criticised by the Managers of COMDEV are the very same ones they reproduce. Let us explore this further.

There is general agreement - which we will not question for now - that the legislation in place to effect local government restructuring is empowering and enabling. But it is also characterised by 'vagueness and imprecision' which impacts quite negatively on the integrity of the COMDEV project. This is how the Acting Director of Community Services explained it:

> Everybody dips into the material [legislation and policies]…it gets interpreted and each time you meet a new tier of consultants or attend a new workshop you get a different slant on it…People are fishing around for an understanding corporately and it is not always the same and it is not always even clear which pieces people are grabbing…And people will grab onto pieces or parts as they interpret it for their discipline and for their life view and philosophical needs.[36]

Elaborating on this through the customer-client 'dichotomy', the Acting Director of Community Services said the following

> Our core business is basically about delivering services and delivering products to a client base…to a paying public. That has been the thrust of it and seventy to eight percent of the public service thinks in that way and I think it is an old way of thinking. It's an old methodology but they have hung onto it because it is safe and its comfortable and its measurable…For example, when we introduced performance management …even as progressives we have been led along the wrong path of actually measuring the wrong things. I still, for example, in my libraries' business plan manage Mr Heiman on how many libraries he has built this year; how many books he is distributing; how many people who come through the door. I judge the Civic Buildings on how many community facilities they've built; how many people come through the door; what ages they are…All these measurables are almost in a way private sector measurable-led and we've not offered leadership; we've not stretched the horizon and said: "But surely, that is not the outcome that we're expecting". Those are some of the measurables but the real output is social cohesion; building communities; how we contribute to the quality of life; how we've added to community stability; how we fought crime; how we assisted in building a new youth leadership… [37]

There are numerous ways to interpret these insights but I will confine myself to only two; i.e. the ambiguities inherent in organisational restructuring and the problems encountered

in effecting restructuring in a context of the dominance of a particular ('extremely conservative') strain of new public management at local level (see footnote [38] for an elaboration of the different strains of NPM). With regard to the former, it is perhaps noteworthy that the performance indicators that this Manager labels as 'private sector-measurable led' are precisely those which the Manager of Finance and Administration uses (see Box 3 above) in the recently introduced district budgeting system which is capable of showing of how spending is being reprioritised. But the more crucial point is that organisational change is non-linear. It involves continuities between old and new approaches, movements forwards and backwards, and changes at different levels.[39] Organisational re-orientations will have to start with a considerable amount of unlearning, i.e. the discarding of prevalent knowledge and the enabling of new responses and 'mental maps'. But unlearning is a central problem in institutions confined in 'outdated paradigms' and 'operational routines'. The learning orientation thus has to be about engineering ways to combine unlearning, turnover learning (significant and irreversible partial changes in the organisation-environmental relationship) and turnaround learning (learning to foster comprehensive, irreversible change)[40] and will of necessity involve new and old staff. The tragedy though is that the legislation driving local government restructuring - in particular the Municipal Systems Bill - may constrain the broadening of 'horizons', i.e. outputs related to social cohesion, building communities, etc. The performance management section of the Bill tends to emphasise internal effectiveness and efficiency (inputs and process) which is fundamentally different to a system that focuses attention on outcomes and impact. It must be about both - not one at the expense of the other. Secondly, the Bill tends to prioritise managerial/organisational effectiveness and efficiency and does not sufficiently elaborate on a municipal system that works in an explicit manner towards the realisation of the values of social justice and equity. Lastly, the rich potential of PMS to deepen democratic participatory governance by linking community priorities to municipal targets and indicators, and seeing it as an instrument to realise the long-term, incremental agenda to establish truly developmental local councils is ignored.[41] In other words, in the current formulation there is inadequate thought about how the annual (less frequent) reporting cycle can be used to dynamise the local political process and re-orientate municipal operations.

Although much can be written about institutional inflexibility; conflicts within institutions; confused mandates; and so forth and how they retard progress, the difficulty that the COMDEV cluster experiences in realising its aims and objectives lies, more fundamentally, in the limitations placed on the directorate by the national housing policy - the subsidy being the key poverty eradicating lever available to municipalities, [42]and the socio-economic driver of the COMDEV project. There is a general consensus amongst housing practitioners that the state assisted-market-driven policy presently in place is fraught with problems. The policy is criticised for amongst others producing dormitory suburbs far from employment opportunities; is deepening apartheid socio-spatial divisions; and more worryingly, is exacerbating poverty through destroying the fragile coping and livelihood systems of the poor. Critics also point out that the budgetary allocations to housing has steadily been declining since 1994 and the real value of the government subsidy has declined by 42.5%[43] (1994-99) due to the rise of prices in general, and in particular, of building costs.[44] Consequently, local authorities are increasingly 'topping up' on subsidy, or subsidising components that affect the house price, such as land price or bulk service infrastructure costs, which strains their solvency.[45]
The impact of the fiscal squeeze on COMDEV's broad development mandate and project cannot be over-exaggerated as advances made in health can be undermined by housing interventions. The words of the Medical Officer of Health are apposite in this regard:

> They're building houses that are just going to blow the TB epidemic up like you're never seen. The houses are minute. They have no through flow…I was called to Montrose Park to visit there by the Health Committee…They have painted these houses all these beautiful colours but you should see how hot the walls are. So they have been very clever. It looks pretty but darker colours heat up the room and the walls inside feel like warm plates on a stove…Sometimes we are making short term gains for long term disasters…From a health point of view what we should be doing is identifying large tracts of land, putting in basic services and letting people…and Ahmedi agrees with me. Another Khayelitsha?…If we want to be realistic to get on top of the housing backlog in terms of health, the point is not what will look nice but what will be healthy - a large shack with water-borne sewerage, refuse removal and clean water is a helluva lot healthier than a little ISLP house. From a health perspective, the way the house is constructed is not a problem, it is much more the size and overcrowding within the house that's the issue around TB and infectious diseases and just general health issues within the house.[46]

While the point made above may not be immediately relevant to Manenberg, what is being underscored is that integrated and co-ordinated development across the different sectors within the COMDEV cluster is likely to become more difficult to achieve over the medium to long term. This is because of significant resource imbalances within the COMDEV cluster, and changes in the broader institutional and economic environment within which COMDEV operates. With regard to the former, the Health Department's sphere of activities is constrained not so much by 'resources' - 'the real issue is equity…and this about redeployment'.[47] The ability of the City's Housing Department to meet its developmental mandate is in the main constrained by amongst others the low level of disposable incomes, high levels of destitution and unemployment and desperate shortages of finances by way of national subsidies. Indeed, research suggests that even the chances of the innovative CTHC scheme being able to meet Cape Town's housing need are very slim indeed given the desperate shortages in institutional subsidies and the squeeze on local government finances making the annual appropriation to top-up the subsidy well-nigh impossible.[48] The implications of this are very disturbing indeed. If the municipality is unable to secure the institutional subsidies[49], savers - including those living in the temporary shelters in Manenberg[50]- who are part of the rent-to- buy scheme will have to wait an inordinately long time to access housing opportunities. The only way that the City will be able to meet its housing commitment via this scheme, will be to use the savings of the poor - the only source of funding that will be available for housing - to house the poor. In short, the poor will have to pull not only themselves but also all other poor people up by their own bootstraps. The present state-assisted- savings-based-market driven housing policy will effectively be replaced by City housing policy funded solely by the poor and for the poor.

What is being suggested here is that while the Medical Health Officer's concerns and criticism are valid regarding the impacts of ill-considered housing policy - 'making short term gains but setting ourselves up for long term disasters' [51] - what is being overlooked is that health and housing departments operate within different resource constraints, and this might explain why they sometimes work at cross-purposes. This dynamic is likely to worsen in light of the findings that point to decreases in resource flows from national level, changes in municipal revenue bases (the loss of income from water and electricity, the redirection of RSC levies to rural areas), costs associated with local government restructuring, and potential shifts in funding away from cities towards secondary towns

and rural areas. Unless a concerted attempt is made to re-prioritise expenditure, the strides made in health could be undermined by housing interventions. Shifting expenditure away from parks, for instance, to housing and health is one area that deserves special attention given that the City's parks budget is 'twice the health budget'. The existing parks budget is used ostensibly in wealthy areas of the city to maintain the aesthetic quality of the environment for the rich residents and tourists[52], while the poor live in squalor and filth. The question that needs to be posed about the impacts of fiscal squeeze goes a tad further than integration and co-ordination. With reference to the work of COMDEV, the question is how to reconcile its commitment to building citizenship or creating the conditions for people to exercise their citizenship in a fiscally constrained environment. It is here that significant anomalies crop up which when cross referenced with the CTHC intervention in a locality marked by very deep social 'pathologies' and reeling from the consequences of a natural disaster, that the COMDEV development strategy sparks violent conflict and sows community division. Let us explore this for a moment.

The mission statement of COMDEV is to advance the quality of life of all residents of the City of Cape. The Executive Director understands his mandate as residing in, amongst others, creating the conditions for people to exercise their citizenship (people are citizens before customers) and creating and nurturing the conditions to govern through the political will. We note COMDEV's commitment to poverty eradication, equity and redistribution and the need to target zones of poverty through strategic and focussed investments. We need to note that housing is seen as the socio-economic driver - which amongst others delivers on the most articulated need of the most vulnerable sector. We also note that effecting social cohesion and rebuilding community confidence are both implicit and explicit aims of COMDEV. How are these aims and objectives to be reconciled with the Housing Rebuild Programme in Manenberg? This is what two officials within COMDEV had to say about the Programme:

Official A

> We *.*.*.*ed it up badly. The problem is that we were too quick to follow Ahmedi's clever solution. What was the really critical issue? The really critical issue was to re-house traumatised people as fast as possible. What we should have done was rebuild the bloody blocks of flats and got people back into their houses in three months…*.*.*.* the clever housing policy and rent to buy and all this…We should have said what have we got here? We have got a terribly traumatised community. We have got a community who needs to regroup and we would have got complete buy in to that…We would have had to add a couple million - [to what we have already spent] - plus the insurance plus a couple of extra million and we could have looked sexy…We could have had all the houses by Christmas. People were too worried that we must keep consistent policy [53] but the issue is …It was an Act of God. It was an extreme thing. It doesn't have to be consistent with any damn policy. It's an exceptional event and required exceptional responses

Official B

> At the moment three ACTs are reeling from housing interventions…All three are impacted upon by the City Housing Process. The Housing [Department] people and the municipality speak directly to the housing beneficiaries…But the critique of the process is: "Surely, you [the municipality] should consult us [the community]". The Housing Department in the City says: "But our legal responsibility is not towards the community, its towards the beneficiaries. We are responsible for them because the Company has contractual arrangements with the

savers." So the housing problem now has become savings-based. The list is not racially defined…and the City doesn't have to deal with the processes of tendering because there's the SPV [Special Purpose Vehicle]. But the project impacts on the community…Because what people are saying now: "Why can't the people of Heideveld benefit? You're bringing in outsiders but we've got a housing problem". People are living in backyards…People are sleeping under the kitchen table. The SPV model doesn't work in places like these

There is undoubtedly merit in both arguments. The first raises questions about whether a housing policy aimed at creating markets and 'stable' households is appropriate under conditions of a natural disaster. The second raises profound questions about accountability and responsiveness to needs. Both however fail to engage with the fundamental shifts in housing policy initiated by the new government and which local government has to abide by; i.e. a shift away from public sector rental housing provision. While many criticise the municipality's approach to housing delivery, it is an approach that is 'consistent with national government's housing policy'. In fact, the CCT policy represents a considerable advance over the existing housing policy as it aims to provide beneficiaries with a house that is either a third larger (40m2) or more than double (64m2) over the minimum norm contained in government regulations Moreover, the minimum saving that a beneficiary needs to commit is R50 per month, which is R50 less than the rental paid by those living in public rental stock (the rent paid by residents is only 2.5% of the annual operating subsidy - see Box 4[54]) and just over one tenth of the cost of renting an average wendy house in Mitchell's Plain (R450 per month).

> **Box 4:**
>
> Residents in the public housing rental estates pay rentals (graded) as low as R50. The operating subsidy per rental unit per annum is R2000 and the large number of residents do not pay and/or are unable to pay their rent.

While these statistics do suggest that the municipality's housing initiative is not the villain that it is made out to be by people who champion alternative housing strategies. The reasons for the resistance to the development initiative needs to located elsewhere. They need to be located in the problematic of a local state trying to remould and recast the notion of what constitutes a 'good citizen' in a fiscally constrained macro environment that does not permit certain types of 'housing provision' for particular categories of the poor, in particular those earning less than R1500 per month (see Box 5 below for some interesting tensions in the area of rental accommodation [55]). In other words, macroeconomic policy has profoundly altered the terms and conditions of the social contract. Enforcing the new contract in Manenberg is extremely difficult. Here residents have been adversely affected by trade liberalisation in the clothing and textile industries; are hard pressed to meet existing rental costs and are heavily reliant on an illicit economy to maintain their livelihoods. Overlaid on this, are limited employment opportunities as people are not appropriately skilled, a national SMME development policy that is ineffective and a deep sense of 'dependency' on the state that is not easily transformed.
The questions that need to be posed in this context are twofold:

> Is the present housing policy of the City creating the conditions for people to exercise their citizenship? Are people citizens first or are they consumers and savers first? Or are they citizens first with respect to water and electricity and for all other services and infrastructure they are savers and consumers first?

Does governing through the public will mean that citizens should be able to able to participate in how 'resources, institutions and frameworks' are 'assembled'? Do they participate in this process as citizens first then as consumers/savers or as citizens and consumers/savers?

The answers to these questions will shed valuable clues on how the municipality is to prioritise and target its interventions in the zones of poverty.

COMDEV, Municipal Services and Planning and Economic Development Services with reference to Manenberg

The restructuring split the bureaucracy into pocket sized battle ships where various departments/clusters had to really account for their own business…They operate as silos [56]

We are looking at complementing each other in informal settlements…working in a sort of a multi-sector intervention there…I am just about to instruct Municipal Services to put in basic services in Freedom Park in Mitchell's Plain. I have the authority to do that [as MOH] but I have been loathe to use it because it is a bit heavy handed…But I think that the real way is to project manage it [57]
In practice, co-ordination and integration happens effectively at district and area level than me battling with Daniels - "I want your planners to work more in relation with our staff"[58]

There are a manifold of viewpoints related to problems that officials confront in integrating and co-ordinating their work across departments; viz. the organisational structure and culture, personalities, resource and capacity constraints, tensions between different disciplines (engineering and planning versus community services), etc. What did however emerge very strongly from the different departments is that integration and co-ordination across clusters and departments is best achieved on an area basis through projects.

Co-ordination and integration through projects assume different forms. Some departments work through structures that have been created by others (Municipal Services for instance), while some Departments create new structures for co-ordinating implementation across departments and securing community and political support (Planning and Economic Development).

Working through structures created by others

> Development support is a support service both within municipal services and
> outside municipal services and both within the Council and outside the Council.
> We are here to co-ordinate and facilitate high profile projects. We are also here to
> provide technical support to line branches not necessarily within municipal
> services…For example, all the civil engineering [roads, sewers, storm water] input
> required for low cost housing is done here…If we are tasked to co-ordinate the
> provision of engineering services to a housing project, we will work through a
> project committee or the project/community liaison officer.[59]

Creating new structures

> We employ a consultant who goes and speaks to the people and works out a
> concept and we then take it back to the community. Internally we have set up a
> team [comprising officials from various departments] that meets once every two
> weeks and the consultant presents to them and everyone hears what everyone has
> to say as opposed to going to different departments…We have set up - through the
> councillor - task teams where local organisations have got together representatives
> who will sit on that task team and will comment and input into that project.[60]

While working through existing structures or creating new structures were identified as
ways presently used to ensure co-ordination and integration, interviews with a range of
officials highlighted that inter-departmental integration and co-operation in many cases
happens despite the institutional structure, due to the drive and personality of certain
individuals.

> Projects that are happening happen *notwithstanding* the organisation. The successes
> within the City of Cape Town, in my experience, happen *notwithstanding* senior
> management and notwithstanding institutional structure…The markets we are
> building, that came out of the Muni-SDF happened notwithstanding senior officials
> and political structures. What we are looking for is the kind of system, which will make
> the lives of those people [who make these projects happen] easier…you have to have a
> political and budgetary system to support these initiatives.[61]

The fact that some people do manage to get some kind of co-ordination going, despite the
institution, is born out by discussions with some officials within the Council. Hashiem Da
Kosta of the Business Development Unit within the Economic Development Directorate
co-ordinates municipal services to encourage and support small business activities. He
liaises with Health, Roads, Electricity, and Cleansing, and in his experience he has found
these departments extremely co-operative. Key to his success, he argues, is working at the
branch level and proactively developing good relationships with branch heads of the
various departments. The district branches are able to respond to his requests to get things
done despite the fact that they are under-resourced
and understaffed. He avoids the Civic Centre and
senior management like the 'plague' - 'If you go to
the Directors, nothing gets done'.[62] It is assumed that
this 'success' is dependent upon flexibility within
operational budgets of each line department and that
he has not co-ordinated the delivery of any services
requiring major capital expenditure. Nevertheless,
this experience highlights that co-ordination of
municipal services is more viable and demonstrably
possible at a branch rather than at a senior

Box 6

This raises two critical issues. Firstly, however
supportive and effective the institutional and
political structure, dynamic and effective people
are still required to make things happen.
Secondly, how do we encourage and retain these
people. When questioned on the probability of
losing good people during the restructuring, an
official of the Unicity Commission replied that this
was a huge problem, but inevitable. It also implies
that it is critically important to strengthen and
support branch levels

management level within the civic centre (see Box 6). We will return to this point later. Although many City development initiatives have used the project- and area-based approach very successfully, the outcomes may not be developmental. Indeed, the outcomes could be quite horrific. For instance, Development Support of Municipal Services is involved in the Tornado recovery and redevelopment. They were tasked with setting up the interim villages, initially to put in the infrastructure and then putting up the temporary units [63] Called 'wendies', the units are rented from the Council at a cost of R16 per month. Approximately 900 wendies have been built on the seven sites scattered around Manenberg, housing up to 10 people each in 18m2. This is how a newspaper report described living conditions in the wendies:

> As icy, wet weather grips the area, there is [a] claim that more people have died of ill health as a result of living in sub-standard temporary housing than died in the tornado itself…[Residents claim] they have …lost loved ones due to ill-health resulting from the cold and damp conditions under which they had to live. They say asthma and chest illnesses have increased among the tornado survivors…[S]ince the tornado on 29 August last year, eight people had died in the temporary camp in Manenberg. In many cases, the deceased's illnesses were exacerbated by the effects of winter, especially in the basic shelters in which they live.[64]

Apart from the quality of shelters, media reports suggest that the quality of the infrastructure provided is extremely poor and that in some cases the wendies are flooded after rains. Residents have described the shelters as 'freezers' and the settlements as 'concentration camps'. Some people have resorted to sending their children to live with relatives because the wendies were so cold.[65] Thus working on a project and area basis might not always produce the type of outcomes anticipated. But it is debatable whether the problems encountered in the temporary shelters relates to poor institutional co-ordination and integration within municipal support services and/or across clusters or is about the materials used, the location of the units and the quality of construction, etc. More research and inquiry is necessary.

As pointed out earlier, the reasons for poor integration and co-ordination as perceived by interviewees were multiple and varied. What is perhaps worrying was a sense that there is some model just waiting to be discovered that will address all problems. But an institutional fix for effecting 'enhanced co-ordination and integration' is perhaps an incorrect way in thinking how to address the problem. This is because of the very complex organisational biographies (power plays, personalities, bureaucratic machinations), the distinctiveness of the public domain [66] (citizenship, collective action, openness, etc) which do not permit the importation of private sector management models. Indeed, research suggests that there is an 'institutionalised core' in local government that is relatively impervious to change (see Box 7 - [67]). A further complication is that the present urban management paradigm, which embraces the values of deregulation, outsourcing, etc renders co-ordination, integration and alignment difficult. Changing the structure, operations, culture and work processes of local government to achieve better alignment occurs in an environment characterised by increasing complexity in the types and number of agents that provide services; the loosening of state control, and the retreat of state-driven planning.[68]

The problems encountered in achieving co-ordination, integration and alignment in the City are manifold. Some of them uncovered during the research relate to different approaches to development planning, the attempts by some Departments to play a gate-keeping role; the under-performance and capacity problems of some Departments tasked with implementing capital projects of another cluster; personality clashes; poor communication; different ways of operating (bottom-up and top-down) and different departments intervening at different scales. Let us explore these.

As commented on earlier, the ability of the state to control, guide and regulate development has over the last few years been steadily whittled away.

Box 7

Some management and organisational design specialists draw a distinction between an 'institutionalised core' and 'peripheral, superimposed structures' that exists in local government. The former (mainly the committee and departmental structure, the annual budget cycle, some forms of line management, various professional codes of conduct, traditions, customs and routines) are apparently relatively impervious to change. The legislative context, the burden of tradition and political sensitivity renders the core resistant to change. The latter (control over human and financial resources, focus of the chief executive office, levels of administrative and management de/centralisation within the municipality, the use of lateral structures to improve co-ordination) are more 'easily' assembled and dismantled. But the core and peripheral are mediated by a whole set of factors rendering alignment extremely difficult.

Although some departments and directorates are acutely aware of this especially those working directly with communities and households who are heavily reliant on an internationalised illicit (drug) economy for daily survival, other departments operate as if they can willy-nilly shape the environment according to their whims and fancies. So while COMDEV is aware of these dynamics and locates its interventions in a poverty-eradication framework that seeks, amongst other objectives, to support existing initiatives and the livelihood strategies of the poor [69], the Planning Department, on the other hand, takes a fundamentally different approach.

The 'flagship' activity of the Planning Department over the past 3 years has been the production of a Municipal Spatial Development Framework (Muni-SDF) which provides a physical framework for development within the municipal area of Cape Town. The Muni-SDF seeks, over time, to 'radically transform the city's structure and form to make it more equitable, integrated and efficient by providing a framework to guide public and private investment and decision-making.[70] As the document notes:

> "It represents a sincere attempt to move beyond planning, beyond individual opinion into positions that can be defended in terms of a logical rationale for the public good."[71]

But the 'public good' is defined by 'professionals', who see themselves as 'guardians'. Whilst the planners argue that community consultation forms an integral part of the implementation, the physical plans are 'pre-determined' and not formulated in response to individual, community or household need. Indeed, they could potentially compromise possibilities for supporting existing livelihood strategies. In their haste to reconfigure space and alter land uses according to some idealised form, they may undermine the productive connections forged by the poor out of the apartheid disconnections; i.e. the relocation of supermarkets to new nodes may destroy survivalist type informal activities. Indeed, working with and through the poor which entails bolstering and supporting their formal and informal strategies of survival is not easily reconciled with a heavy-handed spatial restructuring drive wherein community participation is viewed as a method to 'market' the LSDF. As iterated by the planner responsible for the Manenberg Spatial Development Framework, 'The Act has provided a valuable forum for marketing the LSDF'[72].

On another level, the idea that the Framework is a 'logical rationale' is open to question. If one examines the proposals contained in the Muni-SDF, what is striking is its naïveté. There is little engagement with the economic, technological and social forces that are shaping the city, and which work against equity, integration, sustainability and place.[73] Space can made, unmade and remade through nodes, activity corridors and the like through sequential infrastructure investment. The private sector it is assumed will invest in depressed areas and 'agglomeration' will bring untold benefits to rich and poor alike. Implicit

in much of this very outdated physical planning - and very 'statist' [74] project (see Box 8 for a view on SA planners and planning both past and present -[75]) - is a strong moral assessment of what makes a 'good city'. Interaction, density, walking, high rise, mixed use - these are good elements and planners need to intervene strongly to wipe out the bad elements. It is the same type of moral conviction that drove apartheid planners. [76]

These are not simple academic ravings. Indeed, 'there is', according to the Manager of Design Services in Planning and Economic Development, 'resistance from the rest of the City about some of the approaches in the Muni-SDF …There is still the opinion that planning is idealistic.' Not only is it idealistic, but projects that it regards as 'exemplar' - the Downs Road Market Space (see Box 9 below) - are not without their problems stemming in part from the fact that they are implemented with missionary type zeal without reference to community needs and priorities. So while the consultants told the ACT representatives that it was necessary to increase the density of traffic flows through Manenberg Avenue to connect it to Landsdowne Road, the community wanted speed bumps to slow down traffic especially dangerous high-speed taxi drivers. The community also did not care much for green spaces, trees and street

improvement, and were concerned with more basic matters of economic survival and physical safety. The consultants argued that budgets had already been finalised and funds had been allocated for trees and public space improvement.

When this development planning orientation - physical planning - is combined with a "planners know best" mentality - it is not difficult to understand why 'governing through the public will' becomes a problem. It is not inconsistent with the physical planning approach that participation becomes bothersome, something to be controlled or manipulated to endorse plans and visions hammered out somewhere else (see box 10 below on the nature of the participatory process in this schema - [77]). Hence, the Manager

of Design Services went to great pains to underscore the 'fine line between consultation and community determination'. This is what he went on further to say:

> We are operating under very specific constraints; i.e. time and money. We understand how valuable community input is in achieving a project but we also understand that raised expectations would end up thrashing the project altogether and we need to get something on the ground.[78]

The concern that community consultation is merely a 'rubber stamp' for programme and policy decisions that have already been made elsewhere within the Council is echoed in the Manenberg ACT itself. When an official from the Economic Development Department attended the ACT to discuss controlling the location of informal traders, the response from civil society organisations was frosty: "How do we know that you are not seeking support for something that is already a fait accompli?"[79] When viewed against the Muni-SDF document, such concerns hold some validity.

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

Box 10
Planners and Participation:

To dismiss democratic debate as time wasting and unlikely to lead to agreement reduces participation- where it occurs, to a means of facilitating the work of planners. Participation then becomes 'stage-managed' and relegated to a subtle blend of facilitation and manipulation, or 'facipulation'.

</div>

But the question that begs a response is the extent to which time and money constraints proscribe participation. In recent analysis of community participation in integrated development planning, it is argued that constraints on local authority revenues negate the possibility for allocating resources according to community needs identified during a participatory process. This is because revenue from services and rates is insufficient to fulfil their developmental mandate in the delivery of services. As such, they depend upon conditional grants from national government. In other words, expenditure has to correlate with objectives and programmes that have been identified at a national rather than a local level. Local authorities have insufficient financial power to allow for decentralised/devolution of decision-making about spending priorities.[80]

Another major problem confronted in effecting integration and co-ordination relates to turf battles or the attempts by some Departments to play a gate-keeping role by way of regulating and delimiting the development horizons and projects of other Departments. The Planning and Engineering Departments are key culprits in this regard. In many instances, spatial plans are drawn up and submitted to the Planning Committee for approval without consulting other Departments. This has an impact on the service delivery programmes and projects of other departments. So what happens occasionally is that when a development is about to proceed, a message is received from the Planning Department informing the project implementation agency that the type of

<div style="border:1px solid black; padding:10px;">

Box 11:

But non-consultation with other Departments is not confined to Planning. Indeed, COMDEV is also guilty of this. In early 1997, for example, the then Director of Housing, Billy Cobbett, initiated a process to establish a housing delivery vehicle that became the CTHC. It was not until early 1998 that officials within the Planning Directorate were consulted and requested to identify and release land for the housing development via the Company route. A conflict ensued, and it is the contention of the now Acting Director of Housing that one of the reasons that Billy Cobbett left was because he considered the City 'not ready' for the company'. The Acting Director acknowledges that a great mistake was made in not talking to other departments at the conceptual stage and that conflict could have been avoided.

</div>

development planned (e.g. low-cost housing) is not permitted because the spatial plan already approved by the Planning Committee has designated the land for another purpose. In other cases, environmental impact studies are undertaken by the Planning Department within areas earmarked for housing development and protected areas are declared without consulting other departments (the Planning Department is however not

alone in not consulting others - see Box 11 - [81]). These protected areas often fall within areas that are earmarked as public open spaces. The result is that the protected areas have to be enclosed and protected from access by the public. This has serious operational consequences to operational branches like Parks and Recreation.

At other times, the poor performance of one Department charged with implementing a capital project of another Department (in another cluster) tarnishes the image of the latter. The Planning Department for instance executes large capital projects that require a specialised planning/design service. The Planning Department liaises with client branches and prospective users of facilities and the community during these phases. They also furnish the client branch with project construction cost estimates and cash flow figures that indicate how much money should be budgeted for over the duration of the project. The Planning Department prepares reports and assists in securing the necessary approvals from Council's Standing Committees, and are then "appointed" to project manage the Capital Projects on behalf of the branches. They lease directly with contractors, the client branch and at times with members of the community. Included in this would be the supervision of the contractor's performance, approval of payment certificates to pay contractors for work done and the running of a "costing/administrative" system that should keep tabs on project costs and progress made etc. But over the past three to four years, the Planning Department has failed to resource themselves adequately and have in many instances not been able to cope with the demand in terms of compiling tenders, adjudication thereof and overall supervision of contracts. The consequences of this for other Departments are very negative indeed. Inaccurate information provided by the Planning Department around cost estimates and cash flows causes serious "slippages" to occur on the capital budget of other Departments (like the COMDEV cluster). Poor delivery by the Planning Department coupled to inaccurate information reflects badly on the COMDEV Cluster and its branches as they are seen to be under-performing and not optimising use of scarce municipal financial resources.

Power struggles are but one aspect of the organisational biography that negatively affect integration and delivery. It is well known that there are personality clashes between certain senior executives. Indeed, it is said that battles for control of the reconstruction of Manenberg took place at the senior manager level. Problems were then experienced in trying to realise cross-clusteral decision-making and co-ordination as a result - 'This impacted right down to the communities and made the work of grassroots level officials very difficult'[82]. Egos were also at play at the project level. The project manager brought in to oversea the whole project alienated several of the key role-players within a very short space of time. According to officials who took the project forward, a lot of time and effort had to be put into the project to pick up the pieces and reconstruct relationships.
A further factor negatively influencing integrated development is the generic problem of poor communication between and within directorates. Policies and interventions of different departments or directorates, even within the Community Development Cluster, are seldom conceptualised or planned together. Moreover, there appears to be minimal communication between departments in terms of their activities. This lack of co-ordination and communication sometimes undermines the activities of the various departments. In Manenberg it threatens to undermine the activities of the ACT itself, its legitimacy in the eyes of the community, and the legitimacy of the City - not to mention credibility of participating officials and councillors. A case in point is the action taken by the Existing Housing Department and the Sheriff of the Court to evict illegal occupants in the City's rental housing. The evictions happened to coincide with the ACT organised (through the Health Forum and the City's Environmental Health Department) 'Healthy

Cities Day' celebrations. At the last moment the City's Civic Patrol demanded that the celebrations be cancelled due to the threat of eviction-related violence. While this was bad enough, no-one from the City informed the rest of the community: "We can understand why it was cancelled because the people would have killed the mayor…but the problem was that the people on the street weren't told and that was unacceptable" [83]

But the most problematic component in achieving integration and co-ordination resides in reconciling the way institutions deliver services and the relationship of this to the how communities, households and individuals configure their livelihood and coping strategies. In short, public institutions plan and deliver services at a sectoral level, while households, individuals and communities plan cross-sectorally.

Public agencies use different 'units' (scales) to deliver services and operate in top-down and bottom up ways, depending on what is delivered. For instance, those departments focussing on heath, education and skills development, and economic development direct their interventions at individuals. Basic services and housing use the household as their unit of intervention. Departments delivering recreational, safety and security and other social services focus on communities and target their interventions at this level. Moreover, the different departments deliver these services differently with some interacting very closely with citizens and others operating at arms length wherein it is seen as a technical exercise (bulk infrastructure for instance).

Using an asset-vulnerability framework analysis, livelihoods and how people cope is seen as contextually based and the consequence of inter-related factors at individual, household and community levels. In addition, it recognises that the poor access their social and economic needs in terms of different practical and strategic priorities and needs at different points in their life cycle.

If public agencies plan sectorally, and effective and sustainable interventions require an inter/cross-sectoral orientation, what is critically required for co-ordinated and sustainable intervention is integration of institutional structures both within and outside local government, as well as the development of more participatory planning processes. Sustainable policy will need to focus on those sectoral planning institutions both within and outside government that prioritize poverty reduction and are most effective in reaching target groups, and including them in the planning process. The development of inter-sectoral policy will require identification of the comparative advantage, in terms of sustainable institutional capacity, of different organisational structures in government, private sector, NGO and community based organisations to ensure locally owned and society specific solutions to poverty reduction. But this does not go far enough because different agencies will still target different units. It is thus critical for sustainable development policy to make 'different target groups compatible for inter-sectoral interventions'.[84]

The Area Co-ordinating Teams could become critical in this equation as they could potentially provide the crucial informants on how institutional structures both within and outside local government can begin to work together to maximise developmental outcomes; identify projects, programmes and services that are most responsive to the needs of people in a given area; and identify development initiatives to address the needs of vulnerable groups, and households. Do the ACTs have this potential?

Area Co-ordinating Teams

Assessments of the performance and success of the ACTs varies considerably. One City official considers the Hanover Park ACT to be 'a successful project in as much as it has survived'. The removal of housing matters from the agenda of ACT discussions - to 'avoid sinking the ACT'', is however worrying, and raises the question as to the role of the ACT in reducing and resolving conflict. In one official report, the ACTs are designated a role to 'decentralise problem solving so as to deal with complaints and problems in the area'[85]. Maybe this is beyond their present capacity. If so, then perhaps outside support for conflict resolution needs to be provided by the City. Discussions amongst community representatives within the Manenberg ACT, however, indicate that it is considered a great deal more successful. It has proved, for example, to be very useful in terms of co-ordinating NGO interventions[86] and there is a definite sense of a degree of trust between the community/civil society representatives and municipal officials. Some officials in departments outside of the Community Development Cluster argue that the ACT has proved extremely valuable in building relations between their and other departments. They concede, however, that the relations have been strengthened on an individual by individual basis, and is still to catalyse broader interdepartmental collaboration. But the potential for the building of meaningful synergies is strong. There is however a widespread concern of the impact of Unicity restructuring, the drawing of new ward boundaries and establishment of ward sub-committees on ACTs. There is a call for ACTs to stand their ground and prepare for the restructuring in order to survive. A summit is being organised next year to review the past and plan for the future, with the feeling amongst most members that while there are many problems - particularly with respect to the role of the City - the forum is playing an important role.

But there are numerous problems that need to be confronted.

> It is a view of many officials that although ACTs have an incredibly important role to play on improving municipal responsiveness and governance, they have not been thought through in a systematic manner.

>> The ACTs don't have a budget. But even if we get a budget, we can't spend because we don't have a mandate…For instance, if we want to develop a local youth development strategy, we can't because there is nothing documented at City level to guide us…For instance, about a month ago, one of the Exco Councillors was saying that ACTs must not deal with development issues because those issues have budgetary implications, and surely that is the role for the politicians to inform what goes into the budget and officials shouldn't be doing it…So there are different interpretations of what ACTs are and [they can do].[87]

> The ACTs are not properly institutionalised. Decisions taken at ACT meetings are not always 'actioned' and/or are inadequately 'actioned'. This is a problem recognised by community members and officials alike. Because other clusters and directorates within the municipality are not institutionally and/or financially geared up to respond to requests from the ACT, there is a dependency on 'goodwill' or general performance of other departments to resolve issues. The result is unreliable or non-existent responses to requests channelled through the ACT. For example, the Economic Development Forum of the Manenberg ACT has been unable, despite many attempts, to obtain input from the City's Economic Development Directorate - even to get the person concerned to return their calls[88]. And the Roads Department has not delivered on any of the issues channelled in their direction. The consequence is extreme frustration,

amongst officials and community/civil society members alike, as expressed in the response by the Manenberg ACT Chairperson with regard to a community request for repainting of white lines down the middle of the roads:

'Well surely that's easy, surely that is something they [the Roads Department in the City] actually can do'.[89]

The level of commitment and support from officials in various branches and clusters varies. There is frustration with the ad-hoc and unreliable attendance and feedback from officials from various departments:

'A few months ago it was agreed that there would be a decision and feedback [with regard to the demolition of the Manenberg Town Centre]. We need to get a culture where people do feed back [to the ACT] when mandated to do so.' [90]

This highlights the need for consistency and firm commitment to such a forum on the part of officials. This kind of inconsistency and unreliability compromises the legitimacy of the municipality and the integrity of those officials who attend the ACT meetings regularly.

The roles and responsibilities of the different actors within the municipality are in the process of being defined. But what is evident is that the success of the ACT sometimes hinges on a few dedicated individuals. While attendance of City officials at the level of chairperson - senior managers have been mandated to attend [91] - are consistent, some, less senior, officials attend because of their dedication and commitment. For example, the official who attends the Hanover Park ACT from the Planning Department is nearly always at the meeting. The Manenberg representative seldom attends. The sustainability and reliability of attendance of those lower level officials who are often frustrated by lack of delivery, is questionable: 'I am very tired'[92]. A key problem with over reliance on certain individuals is that the trust and goodwill generated between the municipality and the community could be lost with restructuring.[93]

Managing and co-managing? Whose ACT is it anyway? One of the stated objectives of the Manenberg Urban Renewal is to [encourage the community to] 'move from passive recipients to active participants'[94]. Somewhat ironically, however, there is a feeling amongst some ACT members that the council is trying to control the forum: 'Council will not give up control [by refusing to relinquish the chairing of the meeting]'. It is also manifest in the council's insistence that the ACT continue to use the (council owned) Down's Community Centre as the formal venue when there have been many calls by ACT members for the forum to relocate to another venue.

Integrated Development and Area Based Management and Co-ordination: a way forward (Working ….Tentative)
It is clear that integrated budgeting and area based management of development interventions are a long way down the line. In the interim, there are a number of actions that can be taken within the City to improve the current situation.

Improving integrated interventions at an area – or project – level: This requires the co-ordination of existing budgets and programmes in specific areas and can only happen through concerted interaction between the relevant directorates at a senior level. In turn, this requires better relationships, clear definition of roles and responsibilities and inter-departmental project teams.

At the present time, significant co-ordination takes place at the branch level where there are many experienced and dedicated people providing an excellent service under trying circumstances. More support is required at the branch level of these line functions in terms of resources, training and management support.

'Individuals will always be important. People who make things happen and innovate have ideas even without resources, these are the important people in the future'.[95] However carefully structured and organised, all institutions depend upon the people within them to make things happen – or not. The importance of effective individuals who make the ACTs function and drive area based integrated projects cannot be underestimated. These are the individuals who through their formal and informal networking, relationship building and interactions with people from other spheres of government provide the vital organisational glue to ensure sustainable development interventions. This means that the 'right' people must be found to support the ACTs and to project manage area-based interventions. Concerted attempts must be made to retain these people, which means appropriate incentives, and systems and processes must be put in place to ensure that their knowledge and experiences are programmed into the local government institutional memory bank. Supporting these people also demands good communication and management. It is not possible to co-ordinate interventions when the officials are given 48 hours notice to identify capital and operational budget needs for the next financial year, for example! In other words, ensure that the appropriate type of management and communication systems are firmly in place and are functioning optimally.

There needs to be greater clarity on the functions and purposes of ACTs. Are they about community empowerment and creating a public domain? Or are they about delivery and co-ordination of services? Even if they are about the first issue, they will not survive – nor build their membership – unless they have credibility in the 'community' and a tangible purpose. *This means that they must deliver on at least some concrete developmental issues.*

ACTs are not applicable everywhere. It is important that the local authority does not impose structures in all places. ACT experiences to date indicate that they have the potential to work well in some places – such as Heideveld, Manenberg, and Hanover Park. They are not successful in Gugulethu or Langa where there are strong existing community organisations. Understanding and interpreting local political and community organisation profiles are critical.

Appropriate administrative support to the ACTs is necessary. This means several things. Firstly, a secretarial service so that existing staff – some of whom often already have a significant workload - are not overstretched. Secondly, that specific officials in all relevant council departments are allocated responsibility for following up on ACT recommendations (ensuring that certain issues go to the relevant Standing Committees, or get put onto capital budgets, for example).

The importance of councillors in pushing for efficient and responsive service delivery and effective functioning of ACTs is vital. In areas where there are proactive and effective councillors, there tend to be more involved and proactive community organisations. Manenberg and Athlone are cases in point. Members of the Hanover Park ACT cite examples of 'loose cannon' councillors compromising the work of officials and consultative forums. One seminal example of the latter is the behaviour of

a certain councillor who threw her handbag at an official in a public forum. In Manenberg, the proactive participation of the councillor, in both the ACT and in the urban reconstruction process in general, has been critical in ironing out communication problems with the community and in assisting with the delivery of houses. Councillor capacity building and training is crucial.

The development literature suggests that only a democratic state can create a democratic civil society; and only a democratic civil society can sustain a democratic state. The civility that makes democratic politics possible can only be learnt in associational network which need to be fostered by the democratic state.[96] The importance of the civic empowerment obligation of municipalities cannot be over-emphasised in light of findings sustainable development is the result of strong communities, not the cause.[97] Strong municipalities by the same logic are usually the result of strong communities [98] characterised by rich associational life. Municipalities should therefore concentrate their efforts on building strong communities and organisations that are community-based rather than those that are simply based in communities. Municipal efforts to support community-based development initiatives could include making community-based initiatives a component of the overall local economic development programme; extend active material and non-material support to the local credit unions, community banks, co-operatives, local exchange and bartering networks, neighbourhood associations, informal trader's associations; establishing a network of people or service clubs that can provide technical assistance to community groups; examining ways and means to subcontract to community groups the delivery of community services or the operation of common facilities; provide and/or facilitate access to training and funding to community groups. Local governments should also give greater autonomy to community based organisations and communities, not only in defining their needs, but also in the selection of possible external support. The community should have the freedom to choose, for instance, NGO assistance for design and implementation of neighbourhood infrastructure projects. In order to promote the participation of poor communities and their organisations, media such as popular theatre, press, radio, television, or specific advertising campaigns could be used. Such a strategy is time consuming but the benefits are enormous. The basic objective is to stimulate community based organisations to themselves assume the planning and implementation of projects with the support of the municipality and non-governmental organisations (where appropriate).

> **Box 12:**
>
> In part because of the controversial nature of the housing delivery strategy, and because of the involvement of 'disruptive' entities such as the Manenberg Disaster Committee, the housing delivery related consultation process in Manenberg was reformulated. After several households who had joined the CTCHC savings scheme began to pull out (under pressure from the MDC), the councillor paid visits to several of the affected households and ascertained that they were keen to join the scheme but were experiencing intimidation from MDC members. It was decided that the only option was to initiate more individual - based consultation processes. The municipality disbanded the group that was set up to represent the affected families and intensified the consultation. More council staff were recruited to the programme; regular working sessions were set up with small groups of beneficiaries which also allowed for individual interaction with officials. These sessions enabled beneficiaries to influence house designs and plans. A dedicated housing office was also set up to respond to individual queries and problems. It is only after this took place that the project was able to continue.

While ACTs do possess the potential to make 'different target groups compatible for inter-sectoral interventions', development policy and strategy needs to be mindful of the power dynamics in communities, particularly those in Manenberg. Working through broad based municipal-civil society structures like the ACTs may not be the

most ideal institutional vehicle to address the power imbalances. Reaching and protecting vulnerable households may require particular forms of disaggregated consultation to break the stranglehold of 'gatekeepers' or those who may be inclined to sabotage initiatives that do not serve their interests (see Box 12). As expressed by an official in the DFU, "You need individual consultation. You don't decide to purchase you house in a mass meeting, it is the biggest decision in your life"[99]. Without consultation of this nature, interventions are unlikely to be sustainable. The question is where do the resources come from to sustain this level of consultation that is both intensive and extensive in an environment of tight resources and the pressure to outsource and increase effectiveness?

[1] This discussion paper is prepared as an input into internal reflection and learning processes of the COMDEV department of the City of Cape Town. Views expressed are those of the authors and not the CCT or Isandla Institute.

[2] Swyngedouw, E. 1997: **The Specter of the Phoenix: Reflections on the Contemporary Urban Condition** in K.Bosma & H.Hellinga (eds), Mastering the City I, Hague:Distributed Art, 104-121 (104).

[3] This may sound paradoxical but the case of local government innovation in service delivery under the Blair government may clarify the thesis. Initially, the Best Value (BV) Framework created conditions favourable to organisational learning as councils adapted to new ways of conducting business. Some research findings suggest that councils were more willing to share information with each other under the BV regime than they were under the compulsory competitive tendering regime of Thatcher. The absence of detailed guidelines in the early stages of BV policy development did create confusion but also generated the conditions for innovation. Concerns are however raised that the elaboration of more detailed central government engineered regulations, alongside the push to cut costs and enhance efficiencies, may disempower councils to effect developmental adaptations. In SA, similar concerns have been raised about integrated development planning. A criticism made is that government has defined the inputs (the planning process) and the outputs (the developmental outcomes). The definition of inputs and outputs together with tighter financial control (through a series of regulations and legislation promulgated by the Department of Finance amongst others) raises questions about the extent to which municipalities have autonomy in the planning process to respond to community needs that might fall outside what policy makers consider developmental (See Boyne, G.A. 1999: **Introduction: Processes, Performance and Best Value in Local Government** in Local Government Studies – Special Issue on Managing Local Services: From CCT to Best Value, 25, 2, 1-16; Foundation for Contemporary Research, 1999: A Review of Integrated Development Planning in the Western Cape: Case Studies of Eight Municipalities Conducted in 1998, Cape Town: FCR; also see Ben-Alia, N. 1996: **Introduction** in N.Ben-Alia (ed), Strategic Changes and Organisational Reorientations in Local Government: A Cross-National Perspective, London:Macmillan, 1-20; Khan, F. (forthcoming publication): **Local Government: Yesterday, To/Yesterday and "Maybe" Tomorrow** - Prepared for the Local Governance Learning Network; Cooke, P. 1996: **Institutional Reflexivity and the Rise of the Region State** in G.Benko & U.Strohmayer (eds), Space and Social Theory: Interpreting Modernity and Postmodernity, London:Basil Blackwell.

[4] See Porter, M. 1998: **Porter's Microscope** in World Link, July/August, 14-18 (14); Porter, M & Christensen, C.R. 1999/2000: **Microeconomic Competitiveness: Findings from the 1999 Executive Survey** (available from author); Cohen, M.A. 1990: **Macroeconomic adjustment and the city** in Cities, February, 49-59.

[5] Rogerson, C. 1994: **Globalisation or Informalisation: African Urban Economies in the 1990s** – Paper presented to the United Nation's University Project Meeting – *The Challenge of Urban Growth in Africa* – 15-16 December.
[6] see Phillips, N. 1998: **Globalisation and the "Paradox of State Power": Perspective from Latin America**, CSGR Working Paper No: 16/98, November; de Janvry, A. & Sadoulet, T. 1993: **Market, state and civil organisations in Latin America beyond the debt crisis: The context for development** in World Development, 21, 659-674 (670); Zaaijer, M. & Sara, L.M. 1993: **Local Economic Development as an Instrument for Urban Poverty Alleviation: A Case from Lima, Peru** in Third World Planning Review, 15, 2, 127-142; Evans, P. 1996: **Government action, social capital and development: reviewing the**

evidence of synergy in <u>World Development</u>, 24, 1119-32; Ostrom, E. 1996: **Crossing the great divide: coproduction, synergy and development** in <u>World Development</u>, 24, 1073-87; Habitat International Coalition, 1997: <u>Building the City with the People: New Trends in Community Initiatives in Co-operation with Local Governments.</u>

[7] Friedmann, J. 1998: **The New Political Economy of Planning: The Rise of Civil Society** in M.Douglass & J. Friedmann (eds), <u>Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age</u>, Brisbane:John Wiley & Sons, 19-38.

[8] For a discussion of this dynamic see M.Lyons et al, 1999: **Increasing Efficiency or Closing Doors? The Changing Role of the State in Participatory Development** - Paper presented at the Development Studies Association Conference, London.

[9] Friedman, *op cit*: 21

[10] Friedmann, J. & Douglass, M. 1998: **Editors' Introduction** in M.Douglass & J. Friedmann (eds), <u>Cities for Citizens: Planning and the Rise of Civil Society in a Global Age</u>, Brisbane:John Wiley & Son, 1-6 (2)

[11] Ohmae, K. 1990: <u>The borderless world</u>, New York:Harper Business; Ohmae, K. 1995: <u>The end of the nation state: the rise of regional economies</u>, London:Harper Collins; O'Brien, R. 1992: <u>Global financial integration: the end of geography,</u> London:Royal Institute of International Affairs; Naisbitt, J. 1994: <u>Global paradox: the bigger the world economy the more powerful its smallest players</u>, New York:W.Morrow

[12] Watson, V. 2000: **Local Government And Sustainable Urban Development: What Will Our Reforms Achieve?** - Paper presented to the *Urban Environment Forum,* 26-28 Sept, Somerset West, Cape Town

[13] Ibid

[14] Interview, Ahmed Vawda, 1st November 2000

[15] Ibid

[16] One of the critical silences it will be argued later is the impact of the macroeconomic policy on urban policy. To date urban policy has confined itself to three thrusts: effective arrangements for how government should support housing, infrastructure and other material components of the urban; local government as development institution; compact and efficient urban form. In all these areas, very little is said about how the political economy - the allocation, distribution and use of resources - and government economic policy enhances, promotes and retards the ability of local government managers to realise their aims and objectives. As one commentator recently remarked:

> Not to put too fine a point on it, the political transition in South Africa has transferred political power to new hands. Economic power has not yet been similarly transferred. Economic power is rooted in the cities. Urban policy which does not contribute to aspects of such a transformation - ideas of poverty reduction, physical integration and better management of services notwithstanding - is hardly likely to be politically sustainable (Mabin, A. 2000: **Urban development, urban policy and state action - the South African case -** unpublished, 16).

[17] Ibid

[18] Interview - Dr Ivan Toms, Director Health Services, Community Development - 31st October 2000

[19] Interview - Ahmedi Vawda

[20] Interview - Chris O' Connor - Manager: Finance and Administration, Community Development, 3rd November 2000

[21] Report to Exco, 12 August 1998: **Progress Report on the Strategic Priority of Addressing Zones of Poverty and Social Disintegration** (Nicky Newton)

[22] Interview - Delicia Forbes - Acting Director: Community Services, Community Development, 1st November 2000

[23] Interview - Russell Dudley - Senior Social Development Facilitator, Development Facilitation Unit, Community Development - 2nd November 2000

[24] Interview - Ahmedi Vawda

[25] As of the 1st September 2000, eight ACTs were in place - These include the Atlantic Seaboard, Hanover Park, Heideveld, Manenberg, Langa, Guguletu, Philippi, Mitchells Plain - Report to EMT: **Update on Area Co-ordinating Teams** - Compiled by Dr Ivan Toms, 1 September 2000

[26] Report to EMT, 2000: **Status Report on Area Co-ordinating Teams**, compiled by D.Galant, Manager of the Development Facilitation Unit, Community Development, 17 May

[27] The facilitator is responsible for setting up the ACT meetings and when necessary sub-group meetings; record minutes and other information; monitor actions; establish community profiles; support the Chairperson.

[28] Meetings of officials happen outside the ACTs to assess what has been raised and to ensure that appropriate action is taken. These meetings might be quite frequent when the ACT is set up, but it is recognised that these may become less frequent as ACT becomes more effective and appropriate communication and co-ordination mechanisms are in place.

[29] The role of Councillors at ACTs is to function as a communication channel from Council to the local community; to listen to and participate in community proposals, complaints, plans; to hold local line managers accountable for service delivery and planning; to give local political leadership; to help in local problem solving; to be accountable to the community.

[30] Interview- Delicia Forbes

[31] Interview - Chris O'Connor

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid

[34] Ibid

[35] Interview - Delicia Forbes

[36] Ibid

[37] Ibid

[38] There are different strains of new public management and one can find in the legislation elements of all three. The streams do not form 'successive stages' or 'models'. Rather, they are present in different combinations in different organisations and different departments in one organisation. This helps explain in part variations in organisational forms and patterns, and management styles in local government.

Efficiency	Market	Community
Continuous pursuit of increases in productivity defined on the basis of economics Use of sophisticated technologies as the means of ensuring advances in productivity An approach to the workforce based upon disciplines in accordance with the productivity ideal The recognition of management as a professional activity in its own right; Managers being given the right to manage	Financial devolution and service decentralisation Market adoption as a means of co-ordination Specification of work and relationships in contracts Separation of purchaser (client/principal) and provider (contractor/agent) roles Establishment of trading accounts (for example for direct service organisations) Development of financial management systems based upon accruals and income and expenditure accounts Fragmentation of staff management, for example through fixed term contracts Emphasis on inspection and monitoring of work	Emphasis on strategic decision-making, with the centre of the organisation setting the resources and policy direction for more detailed decision making at the local level Involvement of the public in the management of public services Emphasis on service quality Increased choice for the service user Use of marketing techniques within organisations Working with other agencies (public, private, voluntary) for the delivery of services Emphasis on accountability outwards to communities rather than upwards within the organisation

See Lowndes, V. 1997: **Change in Public Service Management: New Institutions and New Managerial Regimes** in Local Government Studies, 23, 2, Summer, 42-46.

[39] Lowndes, V. 1999: **Management Change in Local Governance** in G.Stoker (ed), The New Management of British Local Governance, London:Macmillan, 22-40.

[40] Ben-Alia, *op cit*

[41] Notably, COMDEV is trying to do this but significant more work is required on this front

[42] Interview - Ahmedi Vawda

[43] Cumulative increase in CPI between June 1994 and December 1999 (Source: Stats SA website)

[44] See Wits P&DM and Isandla Institute: Housing Policy and Practice in Post-Apartheid South Africa (provisional title)

[45] The municipality has responded to this problem through the creation of the Cape Town Housing Company (CTHC) (see box 2 above).

[46] Interview - Dr Ivan Toms

[47] Interview - Dr Ivan Toms

[48] For discussion of CTHC see D.Porteous & K.Naciker (2000): **The Old is Dying, but the New is Not Ready to be Born** (forthcoming publication by Wits P&DM and Isandla Institute)

[49] The reasons for the provincial administration not making available the subsidies are numerous relating in part to party political and personality dynamics. One line of argument suggests that provincial officials were not consulted on the establishment of the CTHC and when the Council in 1998 made, in the words of the Provincial Director of Housing, an 'arrogant demand' (informal interview - September 2000) for subsidies, they were informed that no subsidies were available

[50] As of 3 September 2000, two hundred occupants of Manenberg's wendy sites are taking part in the rent-to-buy scheme (Sunday Times, 3 September 2000)

[51] Interview - Dr Ivan Toms

[52] Ahmedi Vawda - Statement made at Wits P&DM and Isandla Institute Housing Policy Roundtable Discussion - 24th to 25th August 2000, Johannesburg, University of Witwatersrand

[53] The policy of COMDEV was one of not "open[ing] the City to a 'special case' scenario, which raises expectations elsewhere which cannot be met equitably or be sustainable in the future' (City of Cape Town, 1999: **Urban Renewal Proposals for Manenberg in the Wake of the Tornado**, Report from the Community Development, Health Services to the EMT, 2nd November)

[54] Isandla Institute, 2000: **Housing Scoping Paper** (forthcoming publication)

[55] Ibid; http://www.gov.za (Ministry of Housing, 2000: **Mthembi-Mahanyele: Rental Housing Entity, Parliamentary Media Briefing,** September 2000)

[56] Interview - Russell Dudley

[57] Interview - Dr Ivan Toms

[58] Interview - Ahmedi Vawda

[59] Interview - Dave Hugow - Manager:Development Support Services: Municipal Services, 3rd November 2000

[60] Interview - Clive Richards - Manager: Design Services, Planning and Economic Development, 2nd November 2000

[61] Interview - Steve Boschoff, Unicity Commission, 6th November 2000

[62] Interview - Hashiem De Kosta, Area Co-ordinator, Economic Development, Planning and Economic Development, 2nd November 2000

[63] Interview - Dave Hugow

[64] Saturday Argus, 22/23 July 2000

[65] Cape Times, 8 August 2000

[66] Stewart, J. & Ranson, S. 1994: **Management in the Public Domain** in D.McKevitt & A.Lawton (eds), Public Sector Management: Theory, Critique and Practice, London:Sage, 54-70

[67] Greenwood, R. 1987: **Managerial Strategies in Local Government** in Public Administration, 65, Autumn, 295-312

[68] Werna, E. 1995: **The management of urban development, or the development of urban management? Problems and prospects of an elusive concept** in Cities, 12, 5, 353-359

[69] City of Cape Town, 1999: **Progress Report on the Strategic Priority of Addressing Zones of Poverty and Social Disintegration**, Report to EXCO, 12 August

[70] City of Cape Town, Planning and Development Directorate, 1999: **Municipal Spatial Development Framework**, August

[71] City of Cape Town, Planning and Development Directorate, 1999: **Municipal Spatial Development Framework**, August (4)

[72] Interview - Pete Van Heerden, Senior Planning, Planning and Economic Development, 2nd November

[73] see Turok, I. 2000: **The Changing Spatial Economy of Metropolitan Cape Town: Polices for Local Development and Management** (unpublished paper); Harrison, P. 1995: **Changing Cities: Global Economics, Urban Restructuring and Planning Response** in Transformation, 28, 35-50; Bloch …???

[74] Mabin, A. 2000: **Urban policy: presences and absences** (unpublished paper), 11

[75] Muller, 1995 cited in Laburn-Peart, C. 1998: **Planning Practice in South Africa: The Image and Substance of Participation** in Planning Practice and Research, 13, 2, 171-182 (174, 176)

[76] see Robinson, J. 1997: **Planning the post-apartheid city: comments on the Metropolitan Spatial Development Framework - Cape Town** in Isandla Institute, Cities in Transition, Cape Town for a more sustained critique

[77] Laburn-Peart, *op cit*: 176

[78] Interview - Clive Richards

[79] Community representative, Manenberg ACT, 6 November 2000

[80] Ambert, C. 2000: **Participatory Processes for Municipal Planning in Post-Apartheid South Africa**, Johannesburg:Development Works

[81] Informal interview - Joel Mkunqwana

[82] Interview - Melanie Ravells

[83] Health Forum Community Representative, Manenberg ACT, 6th November 2000

[84] Moser, C. 1995: **Urban social policy and poverty reduction** in Environment and Urbanisation, 7, 1, 159-171 (170)

[85] City of Cape Town, 2000: **Update on Area Co-ordinating Teams**, Report to EMT, 1st September

[86] For example, a counselling referral service is working well between the Manenberg People's Centre and the Trauma Centre.

[87] Interview - Russell Dudley

[88] Manenberg ACT, 6 November 2000

[89] Ivan Toms, Chairperson, Manenberg ACT, 6 November 2000

[90] Chris Giles, Manenberg People's Centre, Manenberg ACT, 6 November 2000

[91] With the exception of one, the Philippi ACT, which is now chaired by a less senior manager at the delegation of the Acting Director of Housing.

[92] Interview - Cathy Glover

[93] Interview - Steve Boschoff, Unicity Commission.

[94] City of Cape Town, Urban Renewal Proposals for Manenberg in the Wake of the Tornado, Report from the Community Development - Health Services, to the EMT, 2 November 1999

[95] Interview – David Schmidt, Unicity Commission, 6th November 2000

[96] Amin, A. (forthcoming publication), **Beyond Associative Democracy** (20)

[97] Stoecker, R. 1996: **The Community Development Corporation Model of Urban Development: A Political Economy Critique and an Alternative**, Toledo:University of Toledo Department of Sociology (19)

[98] Vanderschueren, F. et al, 1996: **Policy Programme Options for Urban Poverty Reduction: A Framework for Action at the Municipal Level**, Washington:World Bank, 13

[99] Interview – Nicky Newton.